South Africa

A number of civil society groups concerned with Zimbabwe’s welfare and operating under the banner of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in Zimbabwe have slammed the Southern African Development Community and Thabo Mbeki for their lack of resolve on the Zimbabwe question. In a damning quotation Wellington Chibebe of the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions asserts, ”For the SADC to have mandated President Mbeki to continue with the (facilitation) exercise, that is the joke of the year.”

To his credit, Jacob Zuma has positioned himself brilliantly on the Zimbabwe question. While acknowledging Thabo Mbeki as rightful head of state and thus mediator, Zuma wants to see a Pan-African delegation step in and settle the crisis north of the Limpopo. Zuma’s clear goal is to see Robert Mugabe’s reign of power come to an end.

The ongoing Zimbabwe arms shipment fiasco has not seen Thabo Mbeki at his best. At The Mail & Guardian Richard Calland argues that Mbeki’s handling of the Zimbabwe crisis has further damaged a reputation that already was on a downward spiral. But he further believes that human rights problems at home undercut South Africa’s ability to function effectively abroad. It’s an interesting, if arguably overstated, argument.

Despite rampant inflation, increasing violence, an opposition apparently on the run, mounting outside pressure, and, if British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is the be believed, a stolen election, Thabo Mbeki continues with his untenable belief that all is going to be fine in Zimbabwe. The latest sign of complacency is South Africa’s willingness to allow a ship believed to be carrying arms shipments from China to pass through ports in Durban.

I have tried to present a reasoned argument about the dilemmas South Africa faces as a regional superpower, emphasizing that it is easy to overstate exactly what South Africa might be able to do with regard to Zimbabwe. But these days it is hard to do anything but shake one’s head over Mbeki’s fecklessness in dealing with Robert Mugabe who, while a liberation hero long ago, has long since ceased being even remotely heroic and whose perfidy is destroying his country. The contrast with Jacob Zuma on this issue is especially stark. Mbeki’s “silent diplomacy” has turned out to be no diplomacy at all, or worse, ruinous diplomacy for both Zimbabweans and for South Africa’s credibility as a regional power broker. 

[Crossposted at the FPA Africa Blog.]

[Zapiro, Mail & Guardian, 4 April 2008]

One clear division between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma (and as stark as the political and personal conflicts are between the two men and their supporters, when it comes to policies and platforms most people could not stake out clear and categorical differences between them) comes on the Zimbabwe issue. Thabo Mbeki has been content to embrace “silent diplomacy” that many would be excused for mistaking for complacency and even acquiescence to Robert Mugabe’s dictatorship even if at times it has been unclear precisely what Mbeki could have done in recent years to force change in Zimbabwe. Jacob Zuma, on the other hand, has been rhetorically more aggressive in pushing for regime change across the Limpopo.

Recent events have thrown the differences between the two men into sharp relief. Almost certainly knowing that Zuma represents a desire for change, Morgan Tsvangirai, who has been traveling through South Africa to cultivate support, met with Zuma on Monday, though details of the meeting are scarce as the participants have remained mum. In contrast, opposition parties in South Africa have slammed Mbeki for remarks that most have seen as being fecklessly tepid if not tacitly supportive of Mugabe.

Hopefully by the time Zuma takes office Mugabe will be long gone from the Presidency of Zimbabwe. But if Mugabe manages to hold on for another term, however illegitimate, at least in this one arena the differences between Mbeki and Zuma are clear. 

[Crossposted from a much longer post on the Zimbabwe situation at the FPA Africa Blog.] 

While South Africa maintains its wary silence on the elections, the ANC has issued a predictable and unexceptional statement asking Zimbabweans of all parties to respect the results, however they turn out. One hopes this boilerplate does not ask Zimbabweans to respect any results just because the government announces them however. By playing so close to the vest it is tough to determine precisely where the government and the ruling party stand. Finally, Desmond Tutu has weighed in, praising Mugabe’s legacy in a perhaps transparent attempt to soften Tutu’s request for Mugabe to step down peacefully.

Across Africa, and indeed the world, all eyes are on Zimbabwe. That includes mine, as I’ve been writing extensively about the election at the FPA’s Africa Blog. If it is possible to be both optimistic and cynical, that probably sums up the tone of my coverage.

Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma are bound to be inextricably linked for the foreseeable future — through the resolution of Zuma’s corruption trial or the 2009 election at least — and yet increasingly they seem to represent opposite sides of the same coin. Or to be more precise, they seem to absorb the characteristics of their beholders, who project upon them images that reflect less who the two power brokers are but rather what people want them to be. At times this leaves little room for ambivalence or for reasoned analysis about how one feels about the candidates, but this nonetheless seems to be the plight of today’s ANC, which, if not as hopelessly fractured as some believe, is nonetheless characterized by some fairly important internal divisions.

Despite their vaunted status within the country neither Zuma nor Mbeki are in the most comfortable positions. Zuma has, in the words of the Mail & Guardian, engaged in a recent, and not especially successful, “charm offensive without charm,” and, oh yeah, he is looking at a fairly serious criminal conviction. Mbeki, meanwhile, is in what seems to have become his default position as a beleaguered lame duck head of state criticized on all sides. (When some of your most vocal  support comes from Robert Mugabe’s Ambassador to South Africa, who recently chided MDC leaders for criticizing Mbeki as not being an honest broker in the Zim situation, things are not good better to be damned outright than to be praised by Mugabe’s mouthpieces.) It is at times like these that the private sector must look awfully appealing to both men.

Two interesting developments in the Zimbabwe election campaign. The first is that it appears that many of Simba Makoni’s supporters are hedging their bets, quietly supporting the upstart candidate while avowing their loyalty to Zanu-PF and thus implicitly, it would seem, to Robert Mugabe. One can sympathize with the inclination — crossing Mugabe almost always comes at a cost — and yet during a time when Makoni and his supporters are taking a great deal of risk and revealing tremendous courage, it would be nice if some of Zimbabwe’s most prominent members of the political class could do the same. It is this sort of fecklessness that will help Mugabe secure the presidency again by hook or by crook, violence or theft.

The second story is equally telling. Zimbabwe’s economy has gone to hell over the last few years with nary a helping hand from Mugabe and Zanu-PF for any but the smallest, most well-connected cadre of loyalists.  But suddenly Mugabe is demanding faster food imports, particularly of maize, in light of the country’s food emergency, which the president seems a bit late in discovering. It was not all that long ago that Zimbabwe was the region’s breadbasket. Nonetheless, Mugabe’s nakedly self-interested reaction does bring about one question: If the old man wins re-election, which only a fool or an optimist would bet against, could Makoni’s challenge have awakened in him a realization that he is not bulletproof? Or are these merely the temporal machinations of a despot interested only in consolidating power? I would bet on the latter, but assuming that Mugabe is going to find a way to win, we all had better hope against hope for the former.

(Zapiro — The Mail & Guardian)

The political contest in Zimbabwe continues to mystify observers. Simba Makoni’s candidacy has legs, which in and of itself is a cause for surprise, and possibly excitement.

A British economist, Professor Gwyn Prins of the London School of Economics, has called for South Africa to threaten to cut off Zimbabwe’s electricity supplies, much of which comes from south of the Limpopo, if President Robert Mugabe’s government continues to intimidate the electorate or otherwise sabotages Makoni’s campaign. This sort of thing (as I predicted yesterday) is all that it takes for Mugabe to accuse any critics, or in this case, Makoni’s candidacy itself, of being inspired by Great Britain. Mugabe’s cynicism is nothing if not consistent, and thus easy to anticipate.

Makoni, meanwhile, has been reaching something of an olive branch out to Mugabe, promising that a Makoni administration will not seek to punish Mugabe for his myriad gross violations of human rights. Presumably Makoni can say little else, lest Mugabe simply crush the opposition candidacy right now (I still fear that this step is coming), but it is still disquieting to realize that Mugabe will likely not be brought to account for his many crimes.

Accusations of Mugabe vote buying continues apace. Meanwhile analysts argue that high-profile Zanu-PF defections sting Mugabe, but should not ultimately destroy Mugabe’s electoral hopes unless the trickle becomes a flood. But the biggest X-factor continues to be both the possibility of violence, especially on the part of Mugabe’s supporters, as well as what role the police will play in either allowing violence to go forward or, worse yet, in fomenting chaos. Police officials insist that the election will be peaceful, but then again, what else can we expect them to say?