South Africa

The dueling headlines tell of the tricky course South Africa has chosen for itself with regard to the situation in Zimbabwe. It is widely recognized that South Africa has the potential to be the biggest external power broker, whether through sticks or carrots, words or deeds. And so far, it is no secret, South Africa has chosen to act so tepidly that the country’s virtual inaction can only qualify as appeasing Robert Mugabe.

And so for readers of, say, the Cape Argus, it may have been reassuring that At Last, SA Condemns Mugabe. But for readers of The New York Times the message was quite different: A.N.C. Rejects Pressure on Zimbabwe. So which is it?

Well, as the Argus story makes clear, while South Africa did finally speak out against Mugabe, it also helped to block even stronger statements from the United Nations Security Council, which has unanimously rebuked Zimbabwe.  And in so doing, South Africa’s leaders have once again forced the world, which little understands the situation to begin with, to wonder, rightly, what on earth Thabo Mbeki could be thinking? Loyalty, even fairly blind loyalty, to the revolutionary generation is one thing. But at some point that currency was long ago spent. The idea that South Africa owes fealty to ZANU-PF at the expense of the masses of Zimbabweans desperate for change is absurd. Mbeki’s approach mystifies and infuriates much of the rest of the world. It is hard to see how either Zimbabweans or South Africans benefit from such an approach to the gravest regional crisis in years.

[Crossposted at the FPA Africa Blog.] 

At H-SAfrica, the scholarly listserv on southern Africa, editor Peter Limb notes that there appears to be traction on the part of regional leaders becoming more vocal in their criticism of Robert Mugabe and his regime:

There certainly are signs of stronger views from Africa leaders:

In Kenya, PM Raila Odinga says the run-off is a sham and called for Mugabe to stand down.

Paul Kagame attacked Mugabe: “For me the question that it raises is why do you even call for elections?” Mr Kagame said.

ANC President-General Jacob Zuma says: “I think we’ll be lucky if we have a
free election,”; would it be fair: “I don’t think so.”

As John Leaver notes, the problem is more than Mugabe: namely, the military.

One wonders if this criticism will accelerate leading up to the runoff and if it will result in action in the very likely event that Mugabe simply seizes the election.

Michael Gerson has a blistering column in today’s Washington Post about the crisis in Zimbabwe and what he sees as South Africa’s enabling of Robert Mugabe’s despotism. There is little new in Gerson’s column for those who have been following the crisis for a while, but perhaps voices like his will lead to more pressure from the American government on Thabo Mbeki, whose last year in office has been characterized by myriad failures real and perceived.

Anyone who has traveled in South Africa and talked politics with people has heard something along this lines: This country is just like Rhodesia, and under black rule we’re going to turn into Zimbabwe. This sort of “When We” alarmism, equal parts racist tripe and romanticized fatuousness is also common among expats around the world and among former colonialists of a certain age. It was thus refreshing to see that Jeremy Cronin, in his Chris Hani Memorial Lecture, addressed this question directly. One need not ardently support the South African Communist Party (I do not) to find a great deal of merit in Cronin’s cogent argument that whatever South Africa’s problems, it is not likely to follow the path of Zimbabwe.

[Cross-posted at the FPA Africa Blog.]

At the Council on Foreign Relations Andrew Meldrum, a Nieman fellow at Harvard University and former Zimbabwe correspondent for the Guardian, discusses (via podcast) the Zimbabwe crisis and South Africa’s role in it.

A number of civil society groups concerned with Zimbabwe’s welfare and operating under the banner of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in Zimbabwe have slammed the Southern African Development Community and Thabo Mbeki for their lack of resolve on the Zimbabwe question. In a damning quotation Wellington Chibebe of the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions asserts, ”For the SADC to have mandated President Mbeki to continue with the (facilitation) exercise, that is the joke of the year.”

To his credit, Jacob Zuma has positioned himself brilliantly on the Zimbabwe question. While acknowledging Thabo Mbeki as rightful head of state and thus mediator, Zuma wants to see a Pan-African delegation step in and settle the crisis north of the Limpopo. Zuma’s clear goal is to see Robert Mugabe’s reign of power come to an end.

The ongoing Zimbabwe arms shipment fiasco has not seen Thabo Mbeki at his best. At The Mail & Guardian Richard Calland argues that Mbeki’s handling of the Zimbabwe crisis has further damaged a reputation that already was on a downward spiral. But he further believes that human rights problems at home undercut South Africa’s ability to function effectively abroad. It’s an interesting, if arguably overstated, argument.

Despite rampant inflation, increasing violence, an opposition apparently on the run, mounting outside pressure, and, if British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is the be believed, a stolen election, Thabo Mbeki continues with his untenable belief that all is going to be fine in Zimbabwe. The latest sign of complacency is South Africa’s willingness to allow a ship believed to be carrying arms shipments from China to pass through ports in Durban.

I have tried to present a reasoned argument about the dilemmas South Africa faces as a regional superpower, emphasizing that it is easy to overstate exactly what South Africa might be able to do with regard to Zimbabwe. But these days it is hard to do anything but shake one’s head over Mbeki’s fecklessness in dealing with Robert Mugabe who, while a liberation hero long ago, has long since ceased being even remotely heroic and whose perfidy is destroying his country. The contrast with Jacob Zuma on this issue is especially stark. Mbeki’s “silent diplomacy” has turned out to be no diplomacy at all, or worse, ruinous diplomacy for both Zimbabweans and for South Africa’s credibility as a regional power broker. 

[Crossposted at the FPA Africa Blog.]

[Zapiro, Mail & Guardian, 4 April 2008]

One clear division between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma (and as stark as the political and personal conflicts are between the two men and their supporters, when it comes to policies and platforms most people could not stake out clear and categorical differences between them) comes on the Zimbabwe issue. Thabo Mbeki has been content to embrace “silent diplomacy” that many would be excused for mistaking for complacency and even acquiescence to Robert Mugabe’s dictatorship even if at times it has been unclear precisely what Mbeki could have done in recent years to force change in Zimbabwe. Jacob Zuma, on the other hand, has been rhetorically more aggressive in pushing for regime change across the Limpopo.

Recent events have thrown the differences between the two men into sharp relief. Almost certainly knowing that Zuma represents a desire for change, Morgan Tsvangirai, who has been traveling through South Africa to cultivate support, met with Zuma on Monday, though details of the meeting are scarce as the participants have remained mum. In contrast, opposition parties in South Africa have slammed Mbeki for remarks that most have seen as being fecklessly tepid if not tacitly supportive of Mugabe.

Hopefully by the time Zuma takes office Mugabe will be long gone from the Presidency of Zimbabwe. But if Mugabe manages to hold on for another term, however illegitimate, at least in this one arena the differences between Mbeki and Zuma are clear.