South Africa

Over at The Mail & Guardian the University of the Witwatersrand’s Achille Mbembe wonders what Thabo Mbeki, chief architect of the “African Renaissance,” is playing at with regard to his apparent endorsement of French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s galling recent comments in West Africa. At least on the issue of Pan-Africanism, Mbeki has earned the benefit of the doubt (indeed, possibly too much so given his apparent coddling of Robert Mugabe) but Mbembe is rightfully concerned:

That two years before he exits power, Mbeki would tie his impeccable pan-Africanist credentials to Sarkozy is but the latest paradox in the political journey of a man who has thrived on contradictions. Were he to do so, Mbeki would deeply alienate francophone West Africa, of which South Africa knows so little about. He would also run the risk of giving his blessing to a profoundly demeaning representation of the continent by an arrogant former colonial power that has, for the last 50 years, actively stood against the African project of emancipation.

Never let it be said that Mbeki is anything other than complex, but there is a fine line between being complex and being inscrutable. Too often Mbeki crosses that line.

Two months after taking office after a disputed election fraught with irregularities, Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua finally announced the formation of his cabinet yesterday after weeks of horse trading with the Senate, which has to approve the selections. It is difficult to discern whether this represents good news or bad in oft-troubled Nigeria. On the plus side, it seems to represent collaborative democracy in action, with the senate vetting process going forward as required. But there are also whispers that Yar’Adua’s predecessor, Olusegun Obasanjo still wields too much influence over his successor. Nairobi’s East African Standard fears that Obasanjo might still be “calling the shots” in Nigeria.

Hat Tip to the Council on Foreign Relations.

A couple of items from West Africa caught my eye this morning:

Ghana recently discovered oil off of its coast. But oil has usually proven to be a mixed blessing in Africa, bringing with it what has come to be known as the “petro-curse”: Fueling kleptocracy and division, exploiting poor workers for the benefit of a few, ultimately leading to deeply divided and oftentimes violent societies. Ghana hopes to avoid the petro-curse.

Meanwhile The Financial Times has the transcript of an interview with Nigeria’s newly elected President Umaru Yar’Adua.

Despite the questionable legitimacy of the elections that brought him to power, Yar’Adua hops to be able to implement economic reforms and to open the political system. In so many ways, Nigeria can be an engine that powers the whole of West Africa, and so many observers are rooting for its success, yet the optimism has to be tempered by wariness given all that has gone before. 

First South African workers become embroiled in a general strike the end of which is not in sight. Now it appears that Nigerian workers are set to embark on their own general strike. The Nigerian strikes will be the result of rising fuel costs, an increase in Value Added Taxes, and the sale of government-owned oil refineries to cronies of Olusegun Obasanjo in the former President’s final days in office. The government has made some compromises, but not enough to placate the Nigeria Labour Congress.  

Here is a quick roundup of news stories this morning:

For three different perspectives on the general strike in South Africa see this story in the Mail & Guardian,  this from Green Left, and this from The Sowetan. (Hat tip to Peter Limb at H-SAfrica.)  See also this story from All Africa. And for concerns about the effect the strike will have on tourism, see here.

On the latest from Zimbabwe see this account of the ruling party’s meeting with the Movement for Democratic Change. Color me skeptical. This Michael Gerson piece in The Washington Post helps explain why. As does this.

The ANC leadership succession race is heating up. For some analysis see here.

Foreign Policy has released its annual Failed State Index, and sadly, though not unexpectedly, it is pregnant with African countries. The Mail & Guardian has more here. Not surprisingly, Sudan tops the list. And plucky little Guinea-Bissau is making its own mark by staking its claim as Africa’s cocaine capital.

For the next few weeks I’ll be on the road celebrating my impending (Saturday . . . tick … tock … tick … tock) nuptials and so while I’ll be blogging as I can, it might be both light and a bit less analytical than usual. In other words, more links, less of my opinions. (I realize that for some of you this development represents nothing but improvement..)

Here are a couple of stories that caught my eye today: 

Nigeria has filed suit seeking nearly $7 billion in damages from Pfizer for the deaths of children who participated in an allegedly unauthorized and obviously risky test of meningitis drugs.  According to the story: “‘The plaintiff contends that the defendant never obtained approval of the relevant regulatory agencies …, nor did the defendant seek or receive approval to conduct any clinical trial at any time before their illegal conduct,’ Nigeria said in court papers obtained by Reuters.”

This case represents an example of there being no real good guys. Forgive me if I am sceptical of Pfizer’s virtue in this case. It would not surprise me in the least if a major pharmaceutical company used Africans as guinea pigs. Or at least if they used Africa as a testing ground precisely because Nigeria poses far fewer barriers in terms of regulation, standards and bureaucracy.  At the same time, I may be cynical, but I don’t really entirely trust that the Nigerian case, win or lose, is geared toward bringing justice or compensation for the victims. The Mail & Guardian shares some of my suspicions that the new dispensation in Nigeria may share more than a passing similarity with past regimes in which Big Man rule, kleptocracy, and a general lack of accountability and transparency have represented the rule and not the exception. This is the classic example of  a situation where Africa observers will hope for the best but prepare for the worst.  

Meanwhile in Zimbabwe, it looks like the few foreign investors that remain in the country might see their assets seized by Mugabe’s government. we can probably file this under “Not At All Surprising.”

In South Africa recent studies have shown that many black business professionals are not especially happy in their jobs. The research also dispels a whole host of racially-predicated myths about the nature of “job hopping” in the country. 

Meanwhile, in rugby news, South Africa’s recent thrashings of England saw them break scads of Springbok Test Rugby records. More significantly, perhaps, the upcoming test match against global rugby minnows Samoa will see something unprecedented: when Jake White confirms his starting roster, only two of the seven backline players will be white. Observers are calling this lineup the “blackline.” This represents an enormous step forward in the transformation of the Springboks.

A while back the Sunday New York Times had a front-page article (now archived, so you may need to pay to read it) on some remarkable successes that farmers in the Niger Delta have enjoyed. Chido Makunine of the African News Network provided a perceptive summary and assessment of the piece soon after it appeared. I particularly agree with Makunine’s emphasis on positive news coming from Africa. The Niger case provides a nice counter to the stream of bad news from the region that usually garners front-page treatment.

At Real Clear Politics Peter Brookes, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation and columnist for The New York Post, diagnosis our acute case of the Niger Delta Blues. We now import more oil than ever from Africa — moreso even than the Middle East, according to Brookes, though such numbers tend to be volatile — and yet instability and corruption in places such as Nigeria make for a potentially problematic, indeed explosive, situation.

Brookes’ solution is somewhat obvious: 

In the end, it’s going to take skilled diplomacy. Washington must engage-quietly, if necessary-Abuja to address development issues, political grievances, corruption and the ongoing security challenges, especially to the oil industry.

And yet the obvious solution in Africa so rarely emerges among American policymakers that those of us who write about African affairs tend to resemble voices in the wilderness when we voice them. Of course much of the burden, as Brookes makes clear, lies with the Nigerians themselves, but we will have to be skillful in our wielding of sticks and proferring of carrots to help promote stability, good governance, and a reduction of the almost overwhelming corruption that comes with oil riches in the Niger Delta. The question is whether we are up for the task. We seem so rarely to be when it comes to our African affairs.