South Africa

Anyone who has traveled in South Africa and talked politics with people has heard something along this lines: This country is just like Rhodesia, and under black rule we’re going to turn into Zimbabwe. This sort of “When We” alarmism, equal parts racist tripe and romanticized fatuousness is also common among expats around the world and among former colonialists of a certain age. It was thus refreshing to see that Jeremy Cronin, in his Chris Hani Memorial Lecture, addressed this question directly. One need not ardently support the South African Communist Party (I do not) to find a great deal of merit in Cronin’s cogent argument that whatever South Africa’s problems, it is not likely to follow the path of Zimbabwe.

[Cross-posted at the FPA Africa Blog.]

I do not even feign to be an economist, but many observers, including Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, worry that the country’s current account deficit represents a “major chink in [South Africa’s] armour.” The declining value of the rand and the tenuous state of global markets is also a concern, but as Manuel points out, probably wisely, “If I were concerned every time the market moves I would probably have been committed to an asylum a long time ago.”

There can be little doubt that the past year has been the most trying in Thabo Mbeki’s oft-tumultuous presidency. Tonight he gave his State of the Union address before parliament. He certainly had plenty of fodder from which to work: The electricity crisis, crime, poverty, the daunting prospect of hosting the 2010 World Cup, and simply a general sense of malaise.

Mbeki provided a positive spin, called for the nation to pull together to confront the issues facing South Africa, and praised his countrymen for their resilience in the face of recent difficulties, especially the power delivery nightmare.

The response to Mbeki’s optimism has been skepticism in many, but far from all, circles. Helen Zille,  leader of the Democratic Alliance, whose job it is to be critical, took her job seriously, criticizing the president for “business as usual.” The editors of The Mail & Guardian approached Mbeki’s address fatalistically as did other observers. One imagines that those critics were likely not placated by Mbeki’s address and that Mbeki’s supporters found much with which to be pleased. In other words, status quo ante is likely to prevail.

Let’s forget, if at all possible, the power outages, political debates, Robert Mugabe’s destabilizing jackassery, and all of the other mundane grimness that afflicts South African public life these days. For the world of sport provides two of the saddest stories of all. The first is the fact that Bafana Bafana appears set to bow out of the African Nations Cup with barely a peep barring some sort of freak miracle involving St. Jude smiling upon their boots (and frowning upon some others). It seems like a long way from the rarefied air South African football seemed to occupy in the period from 1996 to 1998 or so.  If the possibility of a flameout from the country’s footballers isn’t enough to arouse paroxysms of frustration (and drinking) then the impending retirement of Protea Shaun Pollack will push most fans of South Africa’s sporting scene over the edge.

The posting has been light of light because of travel and a conference and the general need every so often to take a break. I will pick the pace back up soon. The Foreign Policy Association published my latest think piece last week, “South Africa’s Magnificent Catastrophe,” in which I make some tentative (and merely suggestive) comparisons between current South African politics and the state of United States politics in 1800. 

At The Mail & Guardian Jean-Jacques Cornish has a feature in which he provides an overview of Africa’s 2007. I may as well also remind you of my own South Africa: Year in Review feature for the Foreign Policy Association and this blog.

What does the ANC have in store for it in 2008? The party will have the chance to paint its picture in its traditional “January 8″ statement at a gathering in Pretoria to honor the ANC’s 96th birthday next week. A day before the newly constituted National Executive Committee will meet. Two key issues will be Thabo Mbeki’s lame-duck status and the corruption charges hanging over Jacob Zuma’s head. Thabo Mbeki is not known for going down without a fight. And a Zuma conviction (or even a vigorous prosecutorial case)  in the trial scheduled to begin in August will throw the succession doors open once again.

The Mail & Guardian has issued its annual end-of-year grades for South Africa’s Cabinet Ministers. Find Part I here and Part II here.

After months of speculation and prognostication and forecasting about what would transpire at Polokwane, over who would win and what would result, over the state of the ANC, South Africa has now entered a new phase in its political development. Jacob Zuma’s decisive victory over Thabo Mbeki, his ascension to the top post of the African National Congress, now appears to have created the conditions for months of speculation and prognostication and forecasting about what will transpire until the 2009 elections, over who will win in the future and what will result, over the state of the ANC.

Even as Zuma tries to calm fears over the corruption charges he likely faces in the coming weeks and months he also has to reassure the rest of the world that he is not about to embark on a punitive purging of the ANC. That is not to say that as a result of events in Polokwane there won’t be a shake-up of the ANC hierarchy. But the question, which Williams Gumede, respected observer of South African Politics and author of the book Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC,  addresses in The Guardian, is whether or not the Zuma triumph will result in a break-up of the ANC.  Gumede sounds a largely optimistic note:

For all its shortcomings, the process completed yesterday has been ultimately constructive. The achilles heel of most African liberation movements has been their failure to have competitive elections, either out of fear of division, or deference to the sitting leader. Importantly, both these stifling taboos have now been broken in the ANC. The election has been insufficient and stifled, but even the limited democratic space it has opened is a step forward. Zuma will almost certainly face tougher scrutiny and more urgent demands to deliver. And, critically, a precedent has been set: grassroots members can vote out unresponsive leaders. 

2008 should be fascinating. 

Well, that didn’t take long, did it? The African National Conference delegates who had gathered in Polokwane were barely settled back into their posh suburban homes near Cape Town and Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban, Port Elizabeth  and Pietermaritzberg and all points in between when the news came across the wires. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) has decided that there is enough evidence to pursue corruption charges against their new ANC president, Jacob Zuma.  

So what does this mean? Well, it certainly means that the NPA has a peculiar sense of timing. Seeing how it is difficult to believe that new evidence has emerged in the last few days, or even weeks, why now? Why did this not happen weeks ago? Why not on the eve of the Polokwane meeting? Or why not until after the new year?

And the question lingering as a subtext to all of this is what role did Thabo Mbeki have, if any in all of these machinations? The historical adjective most applied to Mbeki is “Machiavellian.” Is this an example of Mbeki’s Machiavellian nature? What about Zuma? Has he accumulated enough power to have been able to manipulate the system to forestall charges until after his election as party presidency? To bring the charges early enough that he can beat them (assuming he can beat them — far from a foregone conclusion) early enough to allow him to recover for the national election that he surely sees as being in his pocket in 2009?

And what of the popular response? Among his most ardent followers the charges will almost surely appear to be a plot from the Mbeki faction and further evidence that their man is not only a hero, but also a martyr. In an odd way, these charges may well bolster Zuma’s populist bona fides even as they confirm his own Machiavellian streak among his opponents. But surely the charges will also arouse worry, maybe even shame, among some rank and file members of the still-divided ANC.

On more than one occasion I have tried to temper the importance of Polokwane by noting that with a long time to go before the 2009 elections there was lot of political football to be played. The possibility that the NPA would bring charges always ranked high among the potential tectonic shifts. Who suspected that the plates would crumple so soon after Zuma’s ascension to the party’s top post? So much for Zuma’s hoped-for new era of good feelings in ANC politics.