The ongoing xenophobic violence in South Africa has now spread beyond Johannesburg and may well explode into a national crisis. Metrorail authorities are beefing up security in anticipation that the trains are ripe for attacks on presumed foreigners and others.
The recriminations, of course, have already begun, with many pointing fingers at Thabo Mbeki’s government. For a roundup of South African press opinion see here.
Times are certainly strange in South African politics in a post-Polokwane world. After all, where else could a non-violent, indeed, from a constitutional vantage point rather smooth, inter-party leadership transition lead to what is effectively a lame-duck political status for many of those in power across the country at the national, provincial, and local levels? Indicative of this strange set of curcumstances, Thabo Mbeki, whose handling of the Zimbabwe crisis only served to damage further an already crumbling reputation, caved in his support for the controversial Scorpions crime-fighting unit largely because of pressure from Jacob Zuma and Zuma’s supporters and that organization will soon disband unceremoniously.
Clearly Mbeki is aware of this status, as is Zuma, and to their credit, neither man is pushing too hard in the face of realities: Thabo Mbeki is still the president of South Africa; he will not be a year or so from now. Zuma knows that this gives him leverage, but so far he has been loathe to use it too obviously. It remains to be seen whether this tenuous situation can hold. And the standard caveat applies: If Zuma goes down on corruption charges, the whole dynamic of the game changes overnight. Zuma knows this. So too does Thabo Mbeki.
At The Mail & Guardian last week longtime observer of South African politics Mark Gevisser, author of Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred, compares Thabo Mbeki to Barack Obama and wishes that the former would learn from the latter. My only caveat: Beware analogies drawn too closely, as context matters.
A number of civil society groups concerned with Zimbabwe’s welfare and operating under the banner of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative in Zimbabwe have slammed the Southern African Development Community and Thabo Mbeki for their lack of resolve on the Zimbabwe question. In a damning quotation Wellington Chibebe of the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions asserts, ”For the SADC to have mandated President Mbeki to continue with the (facilitation) exercise, that is the joke of the year.”
To his credit, Jacob Zuma has positioned himself brilliantly on the Zimbabwe question. While acknowledging Thabo Mbeki as rightful head of state and thus mediator, Zuma wants to see a Pan-African delegation step in and settle the crisis north of the Limpopo. Zuma’s clear goal is to see Robert Mugabe’s reign of power come to an end.
The ongoing Zimbabwe arms shipment fiasco has not seen Thabo Mbeki at his best. At The Mail & Guardian Richard Calland argues that Mbeki’s handling of the Zimbabwe crisis has further damaged a reputation that already was on a downward spiral. But he further believes that human rights problems at home undercut South Africa’s ability to function effectively abroad. It’s an interesting, if arguably overstated, argument.
Despite rampant inflation, increasing violence, an opposition apparently on the run, mounting outside pressure, and, if British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is the be believed, a stolen election, Thabo Mbeki continues with his untenable belief that all is going to be fine in Zimbabwe. The latest sign of complacency is South Africa’s willingness to allow a ship believed to be carrying arms shipments from China to pass through ports in Durban.
I have tried to present a reasoned argument about the dilemmas South Africa faces as a regional superpower, emphasizing that it is easy to overstate exactly what South Africa might be able to do with regard to Zimbabwe. But these days it is hard to do anything but shake one’s head over Mbeki’s fecklessness in dealing with Robert Mugabe who, while a liberation hero long ago, has long since ceased being even remotely heroic and whose perfidy is destroying his country. The contrast with Jacob Zuma on this issue is especially stark. Mbeki’s “silent diplomacy” has turned out to be no diplomacy at all, or worse, ruinous diplomacy for both Zimbabweans and for South Africa’s credibility as a regional power broker.
[Crossposted at the FPA Africa Blog.]
[Zapiro, Mail & Guardian, 4 April 2008]
One clear division between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma (and as stark as the political and personal conflicts are between the two men and their supporters, when it comes to policies and platforms most people could not stake out clear and categorical differences between them) comes on the Zimbabwe issue. Thabo Mbeki has been content to embrace “silent diplomacy” that many would be excused for mistaking for complacency and even acquiescence to Robert Mugabe’s dictatorship even if at times it has been unclear precisely what Mbeki could have done in recent years to force change in Zimbabwe. Jacob Zuma, on the other hand, has been rhetorically more aggressive in pushing for regime change across the Limpopo.
Recent events have thrown the differences between the two men into sharp relief. Almost certainly knowing that Zuma represents a desire for change, Morgan Tsvangirai, who has been traveling through South Africa to cultivate support, met with Zuma on Monday, though details of the meeting are scarce as the participants have remained mum. In contrast, opposition parties in South Africa have slammed Mbeki for remarks that most have seen as being fecklessly tepid if not tacitly supportive of Mugabe.
Hopefully by the time Zuma takes office Mugabe will be long gone from the Presidency of Zimbabwe. But if Mugabe manages to hold on for another term, however illegitimate, at least in this one arena the differences between Mbeki and Zuma are clear.
The Thabo Mbeki-Jacob Zuma divide in the party has mainly revealed political, ideological, and personal fissures within the African national Congress. But one area in which Zuma could significantly undermine Mbeki (and in the process do serious harm to the country) could be in the area of foreign policy. Zuma’s recent trip to Angola clearly sent contradictory signals as to South African policy in that country. Zuma is head of the ANC. But whether he is the chosen one or not (and one would think that Zuma would try to avoid showing quite so much hubris given the hurdles he faces) he is not currently head of state and he has no portfolio with regard to foreign policy. Even if Zuma wants better relations with Angola, such junkets serve Zuma, and not South Africa.
So, how does one assess Jacob Zuma’s first 100 days as ANC President? As with so much in politics in South Africa and elsewhere, where one sits determines where one stands on this question. While the general assessment seems to be that he has experienced a stormy first few months, survey data indicates that support seems to be shifting in his favor and that he still enjoys tremendous popularity among the poor. It seems increasingly clear that Zuma’s future rests entirely with the courts. If he escapes the corruption charges before him unscathed (or at least unconvicted) he will succeed Thabo Mbeki as the next president of South Africa. But if he loses in court, all bets are off and one can be sure there will be a contentious return to the succession battle that many hopes Polokwane had settled in December.