South Africa

Kofi Annan seems optimistic that he can broker agreements in Kenya that will allow for that country to begin to heal. One of the key elements to any solution appears to be the establishment of a coalition government that will sit until the country can hold new elections, which would probably not take place until 2009. In the meantime an independent panel would investigate what went wrong in the recent polls that have led to the disputed reelection of President Mwai Kibaki and that fueled the political violence that has engulfed parts of Kenya and has resulted in at least 1000 deaths. In the end, Kenya’s is a political crisis, and thus requires political solutions.

Not all observers are thrilled with Annan’s intervention. Justice Minister Martha Karua, the head of the government team at Kenya’s crisis talks, has been critical of Annan for allegedly misrepresenting the state of the complex and fragile negotiations. Nonetheless, if Annan can help to broker peace and establish the parameters for future elections and maybe even political transformation in a country that until recently seemed a like a model for post-colonial, post-Big Man politics in Africa, he surely warrants a great deal of praise and respect. As one who had serious problems with the United Nations during Annan’s tenure there, I nonetheless admire his efforts today. It remains to be seen, however, if the efforts will translate into results. For the sake of the Kenyan people and their country’s future, let’s hope so.

Update: Today’s New York Times op-ed page has two pieces on Kenya, one from  Simiyu Barasa, a writer and filmmaker, the other by Maina Kiai, chairman of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and  L. Muthoni Wanyeki, the executive director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, a nongovernmental organization.

Is there hope for an abatement of political violence in Kenya’s ongoing crisis? Despite more deaths in clashes between protesters and police, allegations of banditry, and fears of ethnic cleansing, guarded optimism may be in order as international appeals coupled with Kofi Annan’a active intervention appears to have led to an agreement between President Mwai Kibaki, whose dubious victory in a highly contested election fueled the current nightmare, and the opposition and its leader Raila Odinga. (The Council on Foreign Relations has a useful background primer on Kenyan politics.)

But the emphasis should be on “guarded.” Leaders who allow violence to be unleashed oftentimes find that their ability to marshal that violence becomes limited if nonexistent. Anarchy as a method of control, so popular among Big Men, has a way of spiralling out of control. Once convinced that one group of people is an enemy and violence is the only course of redress, even the most ardent followers will be tough to convince that violence should cease if the alleged enemy is still among them. Demogoguery, cult of personality, the unleashing of terror (and not the hackneyed “tribalism” that some are so quick to attribute when things go awry in Africa) — these things tend to get away from those who choose to use them as means and methods.

For a couple of weeks it looked as if Kenyans has stepped back from the brink and that the worst was over. But such an assessment appears premature. Violence has escalated in recent days. On Tuesday a mob dragged Melitus Mugabe Were from his car and shot him dead. Were was a new member of Kenya’s parliament and many believed that he held out the promising of helping to bridge some of the country’s divides. Instead, mediation appears to have butted up against hard political and social realities, and some observers  see a country on the brink of collapse. Jendayi Frazer, the United States’ top envoy to Africa, believes that ethnic cleansing may be underway in Kenya, and worries about the consequences of the Kenya crisis for regional stability.

Meanwhile at The New Republic, Alvaro Vargas Llosa, who is not a specialist in African issues, argues that colonialism is not to blame for events in Kenya, under the apparent dual misconceptions  that anyone is positing such a reductionist monocausal explanation or that colonialism is not a factor among many in understanding Kenya’s, indeed Africa’s, contemporary straits. I’d simply refer Llosa (and everyone else) again to  Caroline Elkins’ fine recent piece on the historical antecedents to Kenya’s current crises and remind Llosa and all other observers that it is probably not all that useful to create straw persons for the sole purpose of heroically destroying them.

It almost certainly comes as a shock to absolutely no one that Robert Mugabe has acted in bad faith and announced unilaterally (even as he has been in the midst of negotiations with the factions of the Movement for Democratic Change) that elections will be held on March 2. Now the MDC is scrambling to figure out what to do. Their options are circumscribed: The opposition can choose to boycott the elections, guaranteeing another Mugabe victory, which the wily tyrant will depict as a mandate, or to participate in elections that are pretty certain to be a sham, in which Mugabe secures victory, thus claiming a mandate. This frustrating hobson’s choice encapsulates the frustration of politics in Robert Mugabe’s brutocracy.

Stephanie Hanson, news editor for the Council on Foreign Relations, recently interviewed Morgan Tsvangirai, the MDC’s most visible leader. Tsvangirai gives thoughtful answers to questions on a host of issues, though at time the hopelessness of the opposition’s plight seems almost tangible in his words. He expressed his wish for the world’s response to the situation in Zimbabwe:  “The elections that are forthcoming in Zimbabwe must be raised to the same level like Darfur. There must be an international outcry.” But what has the west’s supposed outcry (which frankly seems rather muted and is by any measure ineffectual) accomplished in Darfur? About as much as it has in Zimbabwe.

Tyrants only know one language, and that is the universal lingua franca of power. Power does not have to mean force, though force is never far from power. Until Mugabe is forced to change, to relent, or to cede control, he will do none of those things. The same can be said for Omar al-Bashir and the thugs he empowers in Darfur. Hand wringing is not enough. It never is.

Two articles in The Mail & Guardian reveal a common trait among nation states and other political entities: A fundamental aversion to outside interference. During the American Civil Rights Movement white Southerners oftentimes claimed that their states were beset with outside agitators, alien forces who were there to cause trouble and then would leave without having to deal with the fallout. This was a nonsense justification, of course, but it did speak to a powerful sense of autonomy and sovereignty.

We see a similar tendency among African states today, though African concerns about outside encroachment are in many ways more valid than those of unreconstructed white southerners. Imperialism, the political machinations that characterized the Cold War,  and neocolonialism are all very real historical and contemporary phenomena. Nonetheless, a zeal not to be told what to do, not to be imposed upon, sometimes leads to overreaction — witness the ways that too many African leaders have rallied to Robert Mugabe’s defense, despite the fact that Mugabe’s victims are overwhelmingly Africans.

 That is why the M&G articles both caught my eye, even though thematically they cover different terrain. The first reveals African concerns about the United States’ new Africa Command (Africom) which, however well-intentioned, still is going to invoke myriad images of American self-interest trumping African interests. America did not serve Africa well during the Cold War, has practically disregarded the continent since except when natural resources have been involved, and has shown little followup on even those African initiatives that might have done good in recent years. This, coupled with the United States recent foreign policy misadventures and general hamhandedness in international relations causes many to view Africom with a jaundiced eye.

The second article reveals the insistence of those on all sides of the political debate in Zimbabwe on downplaying the role that Thabo Mbeki has played in recent reform efforts north of the Limpopo. “This is not just an Mbeki initiative, but a Southern African Development Community initiative,” the Movement for Democratic Change’s Morgan Tsvangirai insists. Again, this makes sense. While South Africa briefly became the world’s darlings, many in the region worry about the country’s disproportionate political, economic, culural and military power. Whether true or not, the claims that Mbeki’s role has been exaggerated allow Zimbabweans to believe that they have had some control over their fate even in the midst of chaos.

Observers and critics of African policy need to be aware of this understandable wariness that many Africans feel about having policies imposed upon them from the outside. Only in doing so will outsiders be able to develop sensitive policies geared toward the true development of primarily African solutions to African policies.

Hopes were high for the two-day Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit held last week in Lusaka. The crisis in Zimbabwe would be high on the agenda. Thabo Mbeki would present his progress report on his mediation between Robert Mugabe and his opponents. Some how, some way, the region’s leaders would broker a solution, or at least break the logjam.

Admittedly this was an optimistic outlook and few of us who observe African affairs believed that any actual solution would be forthcoming. But we did hope that stern words and perhaps hints of action to come might emerge from Lusaka. In short, we hoped for at least symbolic action.

Instead Mugabe received a hero’s welcome, which shocked and dismayed diplomats and other outside observers. So perhaps the welcome was merely an acknowledgment of Mugabe’s status as a liberation hero and one-time brother-in-arms. Perhaps it represented a last hurrah for the grizzled Zimbabwean strongman.

Not quite. Mbeki’s report was feckless and tepid, asserting that the various parties were in discussions with progress being made. To make matters worse, SADC leaders declared that the accusations aimed at Zimbabwe have been “exaggerated,” and that the country will solve its economic problems. Of course no one was able to explain how Zimbabwe would suddenly end the slow slide into chaos and economic failure that has characterized the bulk of the last decade and that has only accelerated in recent months.

I’m not certain if I have ever agreed with South Africa’s Democratic Alliance on much, but the party position, as presented by the DA’s former leader and current spokesman on foreign affairs, Tony Leon, seem an apt summation:

“The Zimbabwean President was treated to a hero’s welcome in Zambia, and the SADC executive secretary Tomaz Salamao blamed much of the economic woes in Zimbabwe on sanctions,” he said in a statement.

The “cosy attitude” displayed by SADC heads of state towards Mugabe, Leon said, was a further indication that the South African government’s approach to the Zimbabwean crisis was unhelpful and inappropriate.

“Zanu-PF’s attitude and tactics will not be changed by quiet diplomacy or a weak stance by our government,” he said.

Leon said statements made by Zimbabwe’s Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa at the opening of the summit were evidence of the contempt Zanu-PF had for mediation talks spearheaded by Mbeki.

“How many more futile attempts to coax Zanu-PF to behave in a responsible manner will it take before President Mbeki agrees to take a stronger more critical stance on the matter?” asked Leon.

What is perhaps most disappointing is that SADC, in not recognizing Zim’s problems, have made it nearly impossible to pave the way for a post-Mugabe dispensation. It is understandable, after years of ruthless European imperialism followed by an almost equally deleterious era of Cold War clientelism, for African leaders to circle the wagons and to resist being told what to do by the outside world. but to fall back on those canards in the face of the current monstrosity that is Mugabe’s regime is to abandon millions of Africans to the capricious whims of a despot. It is one thing to applaud Mugabe if behind the scenes you are working to find a way out of the mess he has created and to ensure that there will be some prospects for success after Mugabe’s fall or death. That is how high-level diplomacy works. But it is quite another to applaud Mugabe’s face and pat his back. That is how acquiescence to authoritarianism works.

So what do I wake up to this morning, just a few hours after yesterday’s cynical post about Zimbabwe? A report in the Mail & Guardian that Robert Mugabe is nearing a deal that will “end a political crisis in his country.”Naturally, if an agreement, which will largely involve the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)  and Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, is pending that is a good thing. And if it is true, as the M&G story indicates, that the potential truce is the result of Thabo Mbeki’s work as SADC’s chosen broker, all the better.

But let’s not get carried away. Mugabe has spoken of conciliation in the past only to continue on his chosen path whenever he felt it necessary to do so. Mugabe can afford to display largesse. By and large he has won. Giving some concessions to an opposition he has effectively broken is a far cry from Zimbabwe’s crisis being over.

After all, also in this morning’s papers came news that Mugabe’s government is threatening to arrest white farmers resisting evictions from new land targeted for black farmers. Land reform in the former settler colonies of Africa is a vexatious issue. Africans have every right to look for reform policies that will allow blacks, and especially farmers, to secure land on which to work and live. But those policies need to be coherent and, as much as possible, fair and without the threat of violence and coercion. Mugabe’s land reform policies were so long a chimera that only appeared periodically as a threat against white farmers whenever Mugabe felt the need to mobilize his base that when he finally began to enact slapdash policies, they proved to be capricious and chaotic. Whatever the necessity of land reform in Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s policies have proven disastrous and have fueled the economic collapse that has characterized most of the last decade.

Furthermore, whatever the good news coming from Thabo Mbeki’s political mediation, most Zimbabweans are little concerned with politics-qua-politics right now. And so while the M&G  carried that good news forward, it also reminds us that fundamentally, Zimbabwe is an authoritarian state. A new report from the Human Rights Forum argues that torture, assault, unlawful detention and other violations of human rights are increasing apace. 

The HRF report indicates that much of the source for this human rights crisis stems from the political instability, and so perhaps the deal that Mbeki hath wrought will help to stabilize the political situation and in so doing alleviate the human suffering across the country.  Any positive progress is a cause for at least tempered optimism. And if Mbeki’s work really is bearing fruit, it will once again prove the essential role that South Africa must play in the region. But success in Zimbabwe is more than likely going to come in small, incremental, and sometimes barely discernible steps. And even as the country takes those steps, there will be steps backward as well. Indeed, as long as Mugabe is in charge, the question as to whether the shifts in momentum take the country forward or in reverse might be impossible to differentiate.

Economic development in Africa can be a daunting concept. Countries with little infrastructural foundation are difficult to penetrate, and one of the key dilemmas comes with where to start. Food security, political instability, military conflict and crime, economic chaos — these problems can make building roads and bridges and phone networks nearly impossible to conceive, never mind to execute.

Perhaps the best way to develop larger infrastucture is to start small. At least this is the argument of Ethan Zuckerman, a research fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School (and a former college classmate of your faithful scribe), in The Boston Globe. He discusses the case of Democratic Republic of the Congo entrepreneur Alieu Conteh, who founded the cellular telephone company that became Vodacom Congo:

His success is an example of a new strategy for building infrastructure in Africa that might revolutionize the continent. Called “incremental infrastructure,” the idea is to build essential facilities — telephone networks, power grids, roads — in small pieces using private investment, instead of relying on large, centrally planned, government-run projects. . . .

The infrastructure challenges most African nations face are enormous. Just to meet sub-Saharan Africa’s current power demands, for example, could cost $70 billion in new power plants — even more if African nations begin using power to process minerals locally instead of exporting them to China, North America, and Europe. But the success of entrepreneurs like Alieu Conteh suggests that African infrastructure is a big problem that demands a small solution.

We need to be wary of panaceas, of course. Big solutions and small solutions are necessary throughout Africa, but Zuckerman makes an important case inasmuch as executed properly, small solutions can become big ones, and by growing organically can help provide the development Africa most needs.

Privation connected to poverty and vulnerability to climate change is wreaking havoc throughout the continent. Lesotho continues to suffer from drought-fueled food shortages. The droughts have also affected Swaziland and South Africa. The economic crisis in Swaziland has led to increased sex trafficking among children as well as women. Informal settlements in Namibia are embody hell on earth. Climate change is leading to an increase in malaria cases in Kenya.

 The news of the increased UN-African Union peacekeeping presence has raised hopes of humanitarian relief for the people of Darfur. Sudan claims that it will support the troop presence. We;ll see how long Khartoum’s conciliatory attitude lasts. Some Sudanese, meanwhile, are looking to South Africa for a blueprint for peace.

At Foreign Policy Stephan Faris worries that the boomlet that parts of Africa appear to be enjoying might be chimerical, with oil fueling another manifestation of the resource curse. The Council for Foreign Relations explores the process of ”hunting for elusive peace.” Despite these real concerns, there also is real progress on parts of the continent, as Kofi Annan argues in the Mail & Guardian.

At The New Republic Eliza Griswold analyzes the Somalia crisis as “the other failed invasion,” which is problematic inasmuch as viewing Africa through the prism of Iraq manages to be both too Western-centric while at the same time allowing Iraq to disproportionately warp our views of other issues.

In order to address the mindboggling inflation rate in Zimbabwe (is it really possible that it could reach 100,000% by the end of the year?) the government has issued  a Z$200,000 note worth $1 US. Meanwhile, add water shortages to the daily sufferings of the people of Zim.  

Two months after taking office after a disputed election fraught with irregularities, Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua finally announced the formation of his cabinet yesterday after weeks of horse trading with the Senate, which has to approve the selections. It is difficult to discern whether this represents good news or bad in oft-troubled Nigeria. On the plus side, it seems to represent collaborative democracy in action, with the senate vetting process going forward as required. But there are also whispers that Yar’Adua’s predecessor, Olusegun Obasanjo still wields too much influence over his successor. Nairobi’s East African Standard fears that Obasanjo might still be “calling the shots” in Nigeria.

Hat Tip to the Council on Foreign Relations.