South Africa

A seemingly ubiquitous crime in South Africa in recent months has been the bombing and looting of ATM machines, especially, but not exclusively, in urban areas, particularly in Gauteng. The professionalization of this crime, and its recent profusion caused the Democratic Alliance to call for a probe of ATM bombings last month. Perhaps the DA’s (politically motivated — let’s not kid ourselves) demands have yielded fruit. Early on Thursday the Gauteng police busted an ATM bombing “syndicate.” It remains to be seen if this is part of a larger operation, but it indicates at least an attempt to get to grips with what has grown from a bizarre agate-type story to a real epiphenomenon.

The controversy over the role of the elite special investigations unit known as the Scorpions has festered in South Africa since almost the inception of that organization. Because of the way in which the Scorpions have been kept separate from the regular police services there has been considerable tension between the SAPS and the new organization. Naturally some of the questions that emerge are: Who is to blame for the divisaions? Who is to blame for the apparent mismanagement and misuse of the Scorpions? Who is to blame for the inability of the new, and in some circles privileged, to make a serious dent in crime? And what role do elite organizations have to play in policing in South Africa?

At least on the contentiousness between SAPS and the Scorpions one voice has weighed in. The police will not be thrilled by his identity or by what he has to say:

The beleaguered Scorpions received support from an unlikely quarter on Wednesday when a former member of the supposedly hostile SA Police Service spilled the beans on what he believes is a “dysfunctional” and “sick” police service that is being destroyed from within by its own senior leadership.

Superintendent Ivan Myers was dismissed as commander of the Maitland dog unit earlier this year for speaking to the media about a controversy relating to the underfeeding of police dogs at the unit.

The accusations of police dysfunction are a bit tough to dispute. Whether or not this serves to justify the Scorpions is another question, but certainly it is in that organization’s interest to reveal fissures within the police and to paint that organization as helpless.

(Zapiro — The Mail & Guardian)

The political contest in Zimbabwe continues to mystify observers. Simba Makoni’s candidacy has legs, which in and of itself is a cause for surprise, and possibly excitement.

A British economist, Professor Gwyn Prins of the London School of Economics, has called for South Africa to threaten to cut off Zimbabwe’s electricity supplies, much of which comes from south of the Limpopo, if President Robert Mugabe’s government continues to intimidate the electorate or otherwise sabotages Makoni’s campaign. This sort of thing (as I predicted yesterday) is all that it takes for Mugabe to accuse any critics, or in this case, Makoni’s candidacy itself, of being inspired by Great Britain. Mugabe’s cynicism is nothing if not consistent, and thus easy to anticipate.

Makoni, meanwhile, has been reaching something of an olive branch out to Mugabe, promising that a Makoni administration will not seek to punish Mugabe for his myriad gross violations of human rights. Presumably Makoni can say little else, lest Mugabe simply crush the opposition candidacy right now (I still fear that this step is coming), but it is still disquieting to realize that Mugabe will likely not be brought to account for his many crimes.

Accusations of Mugabe vote buying continues apace. Meanwhile analysts argue that high-profile Zanu-PF defections sting Mugabe, but should not ultimately destroy Mugabe’s electoral hopes unless the trickle becomes a flood. But the biggest X-factor continues to be both the possibility of violence, especially on the part of Mugabe’s supporters, as well as what role the police will play in either allowing violence to go forward or, worse yet, in fomenting chaos. Police officials insist that the election will be peaceful, but then again, what else can we expect them to say?  

This is not the run-up to glory that Robert Mugabe anticipated when he surprised everyone by announcing that Zimbabwe would hold elections at the end of March. Mugabe expected a coronation. He expected that the short timetable for the polling and the fact that he had cowed or crushed most all viable opposition would surely mean that he would cruise to another victory, and since there is no such thing as a tainted election win in the political world of Robert Mugabe, he would be able to claim that the people had spoken, their will enforced. This victory would allow him the pretense to crush his opposition under the pretense that they were subversive agents of the imperialists. It must have made the old tyrant smile to think of how cleverly he had gamed the system.

But perhaps Mugabe was too clever by half. He did not anticipate the challenge posed by the rise of Simba Makoni. He probably did not anticipate that Bulawayo would run out of money or that numerous civic organizations in South Africa would engage in nearly daily protests at the Zimbabwean Consulate in Johannesburg.

This is not to say that Mugabe is especially worried. And why would he be? He still controls the armed forces and the police. And in controlling the men with guns he can control not only large numbers of votes, but also can terrorize the dissenting factions in his country. After all, the state media announced that Zimbabwe’s police forces are ready to use force to crush any disruptions that might occur through election day. It does not take a lot of foresight to imagine that the police will not be especially nonpartisan when they mete out their particular brand of justice.

Nonetheless, Mugabe has experienced a February that he never could have imagined. He will almost certainly win the election, or at least “win” the election, because that is is will, and the fruits of his will tend to come to pass in the state he so controls. But he had to think that it would all be so much less difficult. It is not always easy being a dictator in a state that puts on the pretenses of being a democracy.

Robert Mugabe turned 84 on Saturday, and the wily old tyrant was in a typically feisty mood, announcing in the face of his increasingly emboldened opposition that “There will never be regime change here … Never.”

Simba Makoni, Mugabe’s challenger in the March 31 election, is unbowed by Mugabe’s intransigence and continues to forge ahead with a candidacy that at times seems Quixotic, at other times mad, and always brave. He continues to be optimistic about his chances of unseating Mugabe, speaking of “renewal” and healing the wounds that Mugabe has opened.

One wild card in this election might be the support Makoni is beginning to draw from members of the military, police, and security forces, a development that I have for some time argued might change the political calculus in Zimbabwe. Mugabe owes his status to the loyalty that he still inspires from the men with guns who surround them. If those people suddenly refuse blindly to follow him, if they choose to pursue democratic change, or simply opt for a new dispensation, democratic or not, Mugabe will find that “never” is not as long a time as he imagines. Security forces can easily wreak chaos. Perhaps they also can help bring about peaceful change in Zimbabwe. Now that would be a change that most of thought would happen, well, Never.

There is a new story about political intrigue, firings, scandal, corruption, and crime reverberating through South Africa with the issue of an arrest warrant and suspension of National Police Commissioner (and head of Interpol) Jackie Selebi. This might represent Thabo Mbeki’s stiffest political challenge yet, which is in itself saying something. 

The Mail & Guardian editorializes hopefully on the prospects of Africans developing African solutions to African problems, using the Ibrahim Index  as a springboard and less hopefully on the Salebi mess.

Meanwhile, recent data from an internal ANC audit of party membership indicates that Jacob Zuma is the front-runner for the party’s presidency. One wonders if this sort of news might not hasten Cyril Ramaphosa to leave the private sector and return to public service. Ramaphosa, who has remained steadfast that he will not run for the ANC leadership, stands as my (mild) upset candidate to emerge with the party and national presidency. 

What are the odds of reforming Nigeria’s corruption ridden oil industry? The Economist lays out the long odds.

The Boston Globe has an editorial about how scientists increasingly can trace DNA — “genetic markers” – to tell us a great deal about not only the origins but also the movement of human beings from our earliest origins in Africa to today.

Is South Africa indifferent to the Darfur crisis? Pambazuka News believes so. There is little question that the country ought to be doing more to address the situation. Also at PN, Rotimi Sankore presents a rather sophisticated cri de couer about the Zimbabwe situation in which, ultimately, Robert Mugabe’s endless reign of power is the crucial problem.

Today marks the 30th anniversary of Steve Biko’s death while in police detention.  

Newsweek has a story on the United States’ efforts to step up anti-terrorism activities in the Horn of Africa as embodied in Africom, the military’s planned Africa Command.

The United States lauds the role that South Africa played in helping to bring about the conviction of Gerhard Wisser, who was deeply involved in the notorious Pakistani AQ Khan’s nuclear netowrk.

South Africa appears to have made some laudable progress on achieving a host of targets related to dealing with the country’s AIDS crisis. On the other hand, there is a cloud of mistrust that charecterizes much of the debate over AIDS policy that will have to be addressed for progress to continue to occur. 

Is division within the ANC largely a creation of the media? Or do members of the party agree? The Mail & Guardian has one perspective.

Your faithful scribe is in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where I am participating in the US Army Combat Studies Institute’s symposium on Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors. I gave a presentation on policing in contested states using the South African security forces in the Apartheid era to explore implications for future policies across the globe. This will, I hope, explain the relative silence this week. I will post as I can, even if only to provide links.

The crisis in Zimbabwe, and especially the economic catastrophe, has proven to have a levelling effect in the country. This is, of course, a levelling in which a draining pool has lowered all inner tubes, and not one in which a rising tide has lifted all boats, and so it is probably of slim solace to the blurring of class distinctions and the loosening of police enforcement of at least some restrictions (since the police themselves have been reduced to engaging in the same illicit activities).

One wonders if this levelling will create political coalitions, radical movements, mass displays of discontent. mugabe relies on a certain level of anarchy to perpetuate control, but that anarchy is, by definition, both difficult to control and as importantly, it may have a tipping point, and if it teeters out of Mugabe’s control it might prove to be another potential force for his downfall.

Opposition parties are making hay out of recent crime statistics indicating that some forms of crime are on the rise:

“We are alarmed at the increase in murder (2,4 percent), the 118 percent increase in bank robberies, 52,5 percent increase in robberies at business premises, the 21,9 percent increase in cash-in-transit heists, and the sharp increase in robberies at residential premises (25,4 percent),” Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP]  spokesperson Velaphi Ndlovu said in a statement. “It once again proves without doubt that crime is out of control in South Africa and that the levels of crime remain alarmingly high, despite empty government promises,” he said.

Inkatha’s spokesmen are balancing legitimate fears with the typical opportunism of politicians, to be sure. But they also are reacting to the realities that KwaZulu-Natal, for example, the IFP’s locus of power, is experiencing increasing rates of criminality. (Though the Western Cape remains South Africa’s “murder capital,” and leads in other alarming categories as well.)  Despite the dispiriting news on the crime front, Safety and Security Minister Charles Nqakula has made it clear that he will not resign.

One positive indicator comes from Hillbrow, where crime rates have been dropping, and where, perhaps more significantly, the perception of crime (which is as big a problem as actual crime in South Africa) the perception of danger has waned. And perhaps Hillbrow can offer a lesson for the furure: Increased police presence and community vigilance has seemingly directly correlated with the positive changes. The obvious solution is better policing and more police, though national, provincial, and municipal governments are financially stressed to the point where such solutions are easier to envision than to implement. Still, given the direct and indirect costs of crime, it would seem that more and better policing would increasingly become one of the domestic policy priorities in the year to come.