South Africa

The formation of a breakaway party of erstwhile African National Congress members comes ever closer to fruition. Former Defense Minister Mosiuoa “Terror” Lekota, who resigned from his post after Mbeki’s forced resignation, has “dropped a bombshell” and “served his divorce papers” to the ANC. Lekota seems determined not only to sever his ties with the ANC but also to move forward with plans to establish a competing political force. 

A meeting of more than 300 ANC dissidents in Cape Town this past has merely fueled the speculation, with their denials that they discussed forming a new party and assertions that they only met to help put the party’s house in order convincing few observers. Plans for future meetings (”consultative conferences”) of prominent former members (it still seems odd to attach “former” to these long-time ANC stalwarts) on the outs solidifies the impending tectonic shifts. 

The formation of a new party will also require the emergence of party leadership. Assuming Thabo Mbeki does not want to assume a position of power – it seems obvious that the post would be available for him and that he would demur — Lekota’s gambit surely must be geared toward placing himself in position to take on the party’s mantel. In case there is not enough drama for the casual observer of South African politics, the emergence of a new party should help quench their thirst. 

Given that little surprises in South African politics, perhaps a reconciliation of the ANC will be possible. Key players within the ANC are playing their roles. President Kgalema Mothlante exudes optimism. How he handles this break will be central to his own political future, after all, so he needs to come across as a unifying force. Jacob Zuma, meanwhile, is predictably combative, asserting that any new party is “doomed to fail.” But for now it seems evident that the party has split and that the divisions, both personal and political, are irreconcilable.

Even as talk of forming a breakaway party from the remnants of the ANC that have fallen out of favor accelerates, Allan Boesak has begun talk of also forming a new United Democratic Front (UDF). The timing of Boesak’s proposal is perhaps telling.

While the UDF, which Boesak helped form, is often seen as having embodied the public manifestation of the banned ANC during the 1980s, the organization, which emerged in response to the attempt of the National Party to engage in pseudo-reform by establishing a Tri-Cameral parliament in 1983-1984, was in fact much more than simply the old ANC wine in new skins. Deeply devoted to local community politics, the UDF in many ways brought the struggle to the people in a way that even the ANC had not been able to do for much of its existence. Boesak’s call, then represents in a very real way an attempt to revive people power and a recognition of the failures, or at least shortcomings, of electoral politics.

The UDF once hoped to “make South Africa ungovernable.” One wonders if a viable new slogan might be to “make South Africa governable again.”

Kgalema Mothlante will have his work cut out for him over the course of the next few months. He will have to stanch the exodus from the ANC, including the increasing likelihood that a breakaway faction will form a new party. He will have to placate Zuma’s most ardent supporters, such as the vocal elements within the ANC Youth League.  And he will need to respond to the needs of a deeply discontent populace sure to demand delivery of services and tired of empty promises. Thabo Mbeki failed this population and whatever Zuma’s promises, Mothlante is in the position to act on their behalf and stabilize the ANC. He faces a treacherous few months, but with the fraught circumstances will come opportunity for Mothlante to succeed in his new office and assure himself a chance to make his new job permanent.  

Brief comments about three separate but interconnected stories:

I am not the only one who wonders if Jacob Zuma might not have overplayed his hand and created a situation the unintended consequences of which might be to prevent him from taking over as South Africa’s president in 2009.  Patrick Laurence speculates similarly in a piece in the Star. Given the controversy that swirls around Zuma , the discontented cadres allied with Mbeki, the wariness of many who see a fractured ANC, and the opportunity that Kgalema Motlanthe has before him, do not be surprised if Zuma’s gambit backfires and spectacularly so.

And while those who still maintain power can deny the depth of the ANC’s divisions, do not be fooled by such whistling past the graveyard. Those divisions are real, they are deep, and they will not easily be reconciled. Expect the rumblings of the formation of a breakaway party to grow louder in the months to come.  And if the formation of a new party comes to pass, it will be yet another outcome for which Jacob Zuma and his supporters will have proved to be woefully unprepared.

Finally, to calm the shaken nerves of investors Trevor Manuel has announced that there will be little change in South Africa’s macroeconomic policies. Which is to say that the new dispensation will almost surely find that nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki embraced the fundamental tenets of free market capitalism for very sensible and pragmatic reasons. There is ample room for disagreement about the nature of South Africa’s economy, and simply prattling on about the wonders of the market provides no panacea. But those idealists and ideologues advocating fantastical solutions in which South Africa will somehow turn its back on the fundamental tenets of the market economy will be in for a rude awakening.

Jacob Zuma has won his power play against Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki resigned from office unpopular and largely unlamented, destined to go down as a disappointment, if not a failure, especially after the heady years of Nelson Mandela,  years for which, ironically enough, Mbeki was indispensible. Soon enough Zuma will slide into what he now surely sees as his rightful position as president of South Africa.

Or will he? Wouldn’t it be an irony if Zuma’s power play, coming as it did so late in Mbeki’s presidency, had the unintended consequence of delaying or even scuttling Zuma’s ascension? After all, what if Kgalema Motlanthe does a good job during these interim months? What if he can unite the ANC, calm skittish investors, and restore normalcy to the country’s politics? Motlanthe kept himself out of the power struggle between the ANC’s two titans. Yet one can assume that his own ambitions never stopped at the deputy presidency and that his ultimate goal is not being realized as a space filler for Zuma. In short, Motlanthe may like the new seat in which he finds himself. 

Meanwhile, Zuma’s biggest strength was always embodied far less in who he is or what he stands for than in who he is not. Which is to say that lots of people projected their hopes and dreams on Zuma largely because he was not Thabo Mbeki. But now Zuma’s baggage will remain front and center while Motlanthe will garner the fruits of incumbency, however peculiarly gained, and may himself benefit from who is is not, in this case because he is not Mbeki, to be sure, but also because he is not Zuma.

Jacob Zuma wanted Thabo Mbeki out of office. He got his wish. But perhaps he should have been careful what he wished for, because Kgalama Motlanthe may well usurp what Zuma for so long assumed was his. It will be quite the irony of fate if Zuma and his allies see what they assumed was their entitled inheritance slip out of their hands because they decided they could no longer live with Thabo Mbeki for another few months.

The Foreign Policy Association has published my latest piece, “A Tale of Two Countries: Change and Crisis in Zimbabwe and South Africa.” Writing commentary on volatile events taking place in real time is always fraught with peril, and in this case I wish I had continued my consistently more pessimistic outlook on Zimbabwe, but on the whole I hope it says something about this historic moment in both countries.

It appears official. South Africa’s Parliament has chosen Kgalema Motlanthe as interim president to replace President Thabo Mbeki. Motlanthe, who spent a decade on Robben Island and who has a background in labor union politics will likely have as his main responsibility the healing of divisions, though the wounds might simply be too deep. The reality is that the ANC is profoundly split and the current state of the party (the current leadership of which is, in the words of one observer, “a motley crew of know-it-alls”) is likely to have historic ramifications.

Some in the party continue to try to paper over the crisis. Jacob Zuma has argued that there is “no need to panic” and argues that there is “nothing extraordinary” about the resignations of Mbeki and a third of the country’s cabinet, which beggars the question of what Zuma would categorize as  “extraordinary” is the current circumstances do not meet his standard. But then it is in Zuma’s interest for this to pass as quickly as possible, for this transition to look like a normal turn of events, and for the ANC to be able to claim that it will persevere and prosper.

Others are not quite so sanguine. Certainly Mbeki is not without his critics despite the way that he stepped down with little fuss. ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe has declared that Mbeki’s surprise announcement of the resignation of so many of his cabinet ministers was a “dangerous mistake” that fueled the economic instability that followed.

And the opposition parties, most notably the Democratic Alliance, sees mostly silver lining where so many see nothing but dark cloud cover. And from a strictly political vantage point, why not? Chaos within the ANC and a potential irreconcilable break within the party will only redound to the benefit of smaller parties, and particularly the DA.  Prominent members of the DA want an immediate election, their rationale being that Motlanthe will not have been elected by the citizenry. Surely the DA knows that an election now or an election in April will place them no closer to the presidency, but it might well gain them seats in Parliament and thus more concrete leverage.

Expect much more of this jockeying for position as the days, weeks, and months pass. It is unlikely that things are going to get less complicated with the passage of time.

South Africa’s political foundation continues to rattle as the result of the ANC National Executive Council’s decision to request Thabo Mbeki’s resignation.  Numerous cabinet members have resigned, including, as promised, Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, and unexpectedly, Finance Minister Trevor Manuel. Manuel has kept open the possibility that he would return under a new dispensation, but that has not reassured the economic community within or outside of South Africa, for whom the latest chaos has shaken confidence, leading financial markets to plummet.

Meanwhile, even as Jacob Zuma perfunctorily tries to make nice and the Democratic Alliance’s Helen Zille praises Mbeki for the dignity with which he has handled recent events, Mbeki plans to go ahead and challenge the court pronouncement that got him into this mess to begin with (or, to be more precise, that provided the excuse for his foes to go after him at this time). There is irony in Mbeki’s challenge in that Mbeki is using some of the exact same language Zuma had used in going after Mbeki to defend himself from those same charges.  A number of MP’s are supporting Mbeki’s challenge, yet again revealing the depths of the fissures within the ruling party.

Adding yet another bizarre twist, Thabo Mbeki’s mother, Epainette, has talked about formalizing the split within the ANC by forming a breakaway party. Expect such talk to manifest itself as more than idle chatter in the next few days and weeks.

Most South Africans, and indeed observers the world over, have been left scratching their heads over the recent events that with dizzying speed led to Thabo Mbeki’s looming resignation and the biggest political crisis in South Africa since the period prior to 1994. Not all are thrilled with the decision and others are worried about the ramifications. Whatever one’s views of South African politics and the nasty personal rivalries involved, this is not an ideal outcome and these are not good days for South Africa or the African National Congress.

Now comes the hard part: What’s next? The ANC is going to have to deal with the transition, ease the worries not only of the Mbeki wing of the party but of the Cabinet, the opposition parties, the international community, and of course the country’s masses. For the time being Trevor Manuel will remain as Finance Minister, a vital step to placate both the domestic and international community as to the continued viability of South Africa’s economy. While Jacob Zuma will presumably win election to the country’s presidency after elections in 2009, for the time being Baleka Mbete, the Speaker of the National Assembly, will likely serve as a placeholder bridge in the Presidency between Mbeki and Zuma, assuming that deputy president Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka follows through on her promise to resign if Mbeki was forced out, though there are some questions as to the exact Constitutional implications of Mbeki’s and Mlambo-Ngcuka’s resignations. 

It is perhaps no coincidence that legal experts believe that Zuma’s corruption trial will likely not proceed until 2010. By that point he will be safely ensconced in office and it will be all the harder to convict him without sending the country into another Constitutional crisis. Thus the recent events very much seem like a consolidation of power that while unnecessary and destabilizing also leave no doubt as to Zuma’s status not only as the ANC’s leader but as the country’s de facto head. Things might work out well. But it is hard to feel better about South Africa’s political prospects now than a week ago, at least in the short term.

Details are sketchy, but it appears that Thabo Mbeki has agreed to resign after the ANC’s National Executive Committee asked President Thabo Mbeki and several of his sympathizers in government to step down. The NEC took a long time in coming to this solution and appears to have been deeply divided.

I am surprised Mbeki went so gently, if that indeed is what has happened. The man will leave office an almost tragic figure. My guess is that when all is said and done Mbeki came to the conclusion that while he could have fought, and probably held on for the remainder of his term, doing so would have damaged the country even further. Mbeki’s controversial reign may be over, and his legacy will long be debated. But i do not think there are any serious doubts that he loved his country. he will surely couch his resignation within the context of that devotion to South Africa.

Make no mistake: Just as the ANC conference in Polokwane in December did not mark any sort of end point in South Africa’s deeply divided politics, neither will this decision. The ripple effects of Mbeki’s forced resignation have only just begun.  Jacob Zuma’s supporters might want to temper their glee for the time being. There is a large and angry wing of the ANC that is not simply going to stand by while this happens. And Zuma’s loyalists had better hope that Nelson Mandela either supports these changes or remains silent if he does not. If Madiba is displeased, that could reshape the terms of the discussion quite quickly.