South Africa

The Europe-Africa summit has come and gone. Robert Mugabe was the most visible figure at the summit, and he made his share of noise, prattling on about most of the same things about that which he prattles whenever he has cameras on him and with his acquiescent media lapdogs at home lauding him as a hero. At least one European leader, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, condemned Mugabe for his bullying, thuggish, destructive leadership but most of the rest of the attendees could not be bothered, just as they could not be bothered to do anything significant with regard to Darfur, trade, China’s role in Africa, crises in places such as Somalia, or much of anything else. For all of the optimistic talk heading into the conference,  division and disappointment were the coin of the realm in Lisbon, where little concrete progress was made.

The EU-Africa summit kicks off tonight in grand style. The central figure in the drama that plays out will still be Robert Mugabe whose very inclusion in the meeting has been the source of much debate in the past few months. Still a hero to a few but a pariah to most, the wily despot, who recently announced that only “friendly nations” will be allowed to observe next year’s elections, will almost assuredly be the center of attention for much of the meeting.

Gordon Brown has every right to boycott the summit, and quite a lot of justification, but an even better approach might be for those leaders who do attend the summit to confront Mugabe frontally. This would give Mugabe the platform that many will dread him having, and will inevitably give him a chance to denounce his critics as imperialists and puppets, but he’s likely to do that anyway. What would be most reassuring would be if some African heads of state, even those who believed Mugabe has every right to attend the meeting, broke their silence to condemn Mugabe’s brutal regime.

The Council on Foreign Relations has a fantastic interactive map of Africa’s conflict zones and areas of UN/African Union intervention past and presence, as well as an option to see the contours of former colonial rule and influence. This is a first-rate resource for those who want to understand Africa’s divisions, particularly for students.

The UN recently called for a rare summit on Africa and predictably, promises were made, agendas were set, ideas proposed. While it is good to see Africa on the global agenda in such a visible way, many Africans are rightly skeptical:

“Africa’s agenda will increasingly be defined by the African Union,” said AU chairman Alpha Oumar Konare. “We hope to move beyond words, to move beyond promises because too many promises have already been made to Africa.”

One does, however, wonder if Konare is not whistling past the graveyard. Naturally Africans should set their agenda. But so far, the AU, for example, has shown little capacity for effectiveness in Sudan. So far, SADC has proved loath to intervene in Zimbabwe. Perhaps it is still right that Africa choose to address and not to address these issues. But it seems that if the world wants to help, Africans ought to welcome that help, as long as African leaders make clear that they set the agenda and they provide the leadership and they create the structures in which Europeans, Americans and others might operate. In other words, African solutions for African problems, but with whatever help the West is willing to provide in a subordinate capacity.

Western involvement does not have to mean neocolonialism, though as Thabo Mbeki argued before the General Assembly yesterday, the very structure of that organization does favor rich nations over poor ones. Mbeki further asserted that even with their augmented status, developed nations are failing the developing world.  Perhaps the west is listening (now look who is whistling past the graveyard!) and can come to the conclusion that western help under African control might pave a new road for African relations with Europe, the United States, and elsewhere.

Do you remember the climactic scene from the Wizard of Oz? Dorothy, Scarecrow, the Tin Man, and the Cowardly Lion are trapped by the Wicked Witch and her Praetorian guard. The Witch taunts Scarecrow with fire, as is her wont, and then sets him alight. Dorothy reacts instinctively, grabbing a handy pail of water from the castle wall and dousing both the scarecrow but also the Wicked Witch with it. The water liquidates the Witch. For a moment it is unclear what the Witch’s henchmen will do, but they announce “All Hail, Dorothy” and give the little girl the Witch’s broom to allow them to fulfill the great and Powerful Wizard’s task for them.

Of course, had the Witch’s personal defense force reacted differently, there would have been nothing left but straw and tin and lionine flesh and the tatters of a teenaged girl’s gingham dress. Dorothy, more than anything, got lucky.

Jeff Jacoby, the arch-conservative columnist of The Boston Globe, apparently never considered this lesson when watching the Wizard of Oz. In a column yesterday, Jacoby presented a well-written, ardent, impassioned, clear argument for either the United States or Great Britain invading Zimbabwe. He also could not be more wrong. 

Jacoby uses Pius Ncube’s recent statements about the prospects of a Zimbabwe invasion as a springboard to justify foreign miliary action (a belief that, as you may recall, Jacoby is not alone in considering, though he may be alone in his blind optimism). And Jacoby believes that such an invasion would be easy:

“Countless lives could be saved, and incalculable suffering ended, if Mugabe were forced from power. A detachment of US Marines, I wrote on this page in 2002, could do the job on its lunch break. The British could do it. South Africa could do it.”

First off, one would think that Jacoby would not be so blithe about the American military’s capacity to overthrow a dictator without any serious difficulties in light of what has gone on in Iraq. As we have seen, the overthrowing is the easy part. What comes next is what becomes a nightmare. Once lunch break is over, then what? How does a US or British (or South African) force then deal with the aftermath, which is sort of the important part? What will the succession struggle look like? Will chopping off the head end all of Zimbabwe’s problems, or will doing so serve as a multiplier effect and simply add to the misery? 

Second, how does such an invasion take place? Zimbabwe is, if Jacoby has not noticed, landlocked. Which African countries allow a foreign troop presence to use their country as a staging ground for military action that might work to remove Mugabe from power but that almost certainly will fuel chaos across the border? And which countries allow the troop presence of either a former colonial power or of a United States that has not exactly acquitted itself well in recent years when it has come to foreign invasions?

Third, the mission matters. Observers (myself included) have long said that a few thousand troops could have prevented the genocide in Rwanda. Similarly, many believe that a similar number of troops could ease the suffering in Darfur. But these would be preventative measures — the troop presence would serve to stop members of paramilitaries from attacking and killing civilians. That is a far cry from forcing regime change, even if regime change is necessary and justified.  

But most significantly, will such a presence get lucky, as Dorothy and her friends did in the castle? Will Mugabe’s military and police, will his private guard, simply accede to the death of their leader? Surely some will. But many won’t. And those that won’t will come from the revolutionary generation, the generation that knows the bush, that has fought in the bush, that has benefitted from Mugabe’s cronyism and kleptocracy, and that will want to have a serious say in what is to follow. Dorothy, remember, got lucky.

This is not to say that the military option should not be on the table. But it is to say that blithe assertions of the ease with which a British or American military effort could solve the crisis should not be taken seriously.  If SADC or the African Union choose to pursue the military option and if they ask the US or UK for support, that is one thing. But to propose such action to derive from Washington or London, Pius Ncube’s frustrated talk notwithstanding, is to live in Oz, a wonderland detached from reality where the roads are golden, the scarecrows talk, and monkeymen fly. It is, in short, to live in a fantasy world.    

The sometimes problematic nature of China’s relationship with Africa is nowhere more stark than in Beijing’s engagement with Sudan (see also here, here, here, here, and here). Over at The New Republic Eric Reeves, one of the foremost authorities on the crisis in Darfur, has a piece telling us to be wary of China’s support for UN Resolution 1769, in which the United Nations Security Council authorized a joint UN-African Union (AU) force to intervene in Darfur.

Although China did vote to support the resolution this year (last year they abstained so as not to breach Khartoum’s sovereignty, or so they would have had you believe) Reeves would not be so fast to heap praise on Beijing for coming around: “Winning China’s support came at a significant price. Khartoum’s staunchest ally voted for the resolution only after it had helped to secure the elimination of key provisions.” Reeves also shows that there is blame enough to go around among Western powers and not just China.

It will be seen if this resolution proves to be another half-measure that falls short in reality. One hopes that a demonstrable use of force — the threat of which really has been the only stick to which Khartoum has responded consistently — will set the stage for a long-term solution in Darfur. But until we are given reason to believe otherwise, skepticism will rule the day. Nonetheless, the authorization of troops and the willingness to use force signals a vital step forward if the troop presence comes to pass.

Privation connected to poverty and vulnerability to climate change is wreaking havoc throughout the continent. Lesotho continues to suffer from drought-fueled food shortages. The droughts have also affected Swaziland and South Africa. The economic crisis in Swaziland has led to increased sex trafficking among children as well as women. Informal settlements in Namibia are embody hell on earth. Climate change is leading to an increase in malaria cases in Kenya.

 The news of the increased UN-African Union peacekeeping presence has raised hopes of humanitarian relief for the people of Darfur. Sudan claims that it will support the troop presence. We;ll see how long Khartoum’s conciliatory attitude lasts. Some Sudanese, meanwhile, are looking to South Africa for a blueprint for peace.

At Foreign Policy Stephan Faris worries that the boomlet that parts of Africa appear to be enjoying might be chimerical, with oil fueling another manifestation of the resource curse. The Council for Foreign Relations explores the process of ”hunting for elusive peace.” Despite these real concerns, there also is real progress on parts of the continent, as Kofi Annan argues in the Mail & Guardian.

At The New Republic Eliza Griswold analyzes the Somalia crisis as “the other failed invasion,” which is problematic inasmuch as viewing Africa through the prism of Iraq manages to be both too Western-centric while at the same time allowing Iraq to disproportionately warp our views of other issues.

In order to address the mindboggling inflation rate in Zimbabwe (is it really possible that it could reach 100,000% by the end of the year?) the government has issued  a Z$200,000 note worth $1 US. Meanwhile, add water shortages to the daily sufferings of the people of Zim.  

Not at all surprisingly, the Mugabe government’s unilateral price cutting, and crackdown on those who would defy it, has proven to be a short-term palliative and not a long-term solution. Store shelves are empty. Shortages reign. Prices may be low, but no one can buy goods. Producers have stopped producing, store owners have stopped purchasing goods — for both, the price cuts mean that they operate at a loss most of the time.

Dissenters argue, almost assuredly rightly, that this is yet another ploy in Mugabe’s arsenal of tricks, demogoguery to appease the masses and win support or at least ease some of the sting of opposition. For now one of the most vocal critics of Mugabe, Pius Ncube, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Bulawayo, hopes that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union will be able to pressure Mugabe into enacting democratic reforms or something resembling them. But one senses that Ncube is skeptical of the efficacy of these organizations and of Thabo Mbeki, the AU’s designated choice to mediate the crisis in Zimbabwe.  For its part, South Africa would like the SADC to step in and try to salvage that which is salvageable in Zimbabwe’s economy. The AU wants South Africa to act. South Africa wants SADC to act.

It would be nice if the African Union, South Africa, and SADC would get together and act in concert rather than pass the buck. I continue to be sleptical about precisely what can be done to force Mugabe’s hand, but this sort of circularity surely is not the solution.

The Foreign Policy Association’s own Robert Nolan has been reporting on the African Union Summit in Accra. His recent FPA piece on early steps to establish a United States of Africa can also be found at allAfrica.

The African Union’s (AU)  predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), established a process called the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as part of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The AU has moved forward with APRM, which, whatever its shortcomings, holds great promise to help African nations spur one another toward good governance, best practices, and accountability. So far 26 African countries have signed on to the process, with others soon to follow. In keeping with the spirit of the African Renaissance that Thabo Mbeki has long championed, the APRM theoretically will enable Africans to develop African solutions for African problems, further moving the continent away from both the burdens of the colonial past and the dependence of the neocolonial present.

South Africa is now in the final stages of dealing with its review, which consisted of a combination of criticism, suggestions, concerns, and praise. The South African response has run the gamut from incensed to dilatory to resigned to determined. Initially, the word was that the South Africans were outraged and that Pretoria was set to reject the entire report summarily. But now that South Africa is participating in the African Union summit in Accra, Mbeki’s administration seems more acquiescent and even accepting of the APRM. Mbeki savvily sidestepped most of the most ardent (some Africans might say “strident”) criticisms of what he called  ”a positive report that acknowledges the huge strides made by South Africa in transforming the country into a vibrant democracy with one of the most progressive constitutions in the world”.

I think I understand both the harsh initial response and the more conciliatory recent indications from Mbeki’s government. In the first place it must have been difficult for South Africa to swallow criticisms — some rather harsh — from a body that consists of many nations that have not achieved South Africa’s successes, from countries that, right or wrong, South Africa sees as being its lessers. South Africa sees itself as a continental leader and regional power. Hearing criticisms from countries that enjoy the fruits of operating from within South Africa’s penumbra surely must have galled Pretoria, which likely expected a rubber stamp and pats on the back from the continent’s leaders. It is perhaps reassuring that such obeisance did not emerge from the APRM.

But South Africa’s change of tone also stands to reason. After all, South Africa fancies itself as the driving force behind the continent’s hoped-for future direction. Any African Renaissance that occurs will have South Africa’s imprimatur and South Africa’s fingerprints all over it. For South Africa to scuttle one of the chief mechanisms by which the continent can achieve its goals would be churlish, impetuous, and self destructive.

But there is another possible explanation for South Africa’s newfound change of heart: Initially the government was stung, in a sense, by the criticisms, which surely seemed harsh and highly critical. But the passage of time has allowed South Africa to take a step back, to find the positive in the report, to look at the negatives as constructive criticism, and as importantly, to look at that criticism as being largely accurate. The truth sometimes hurts, it is said. But that pain makes it no less true.