South Africa

The Council on Foreign Relations has a fantastic interactive map of Africa’s conflict zones and areas of UN/African Union intervention past and presence, as well as an option to see the contours of former colonial rule and influence. This is a first-rate resource for those who want to understand Africa’s divisions, particularly for students.

Hopes were high for the two-day Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit held last week in Lusaka. The crisis in Zimbabwe would be high on the agenda. Thabo Mbeki would present his progress report on his mediation between Robert Mugabe and his opponents. Some how, some way, the region’s leaders would broker a solution, or at least break the logjam.

Admittedly this was an optimistic outlook and few of us who observe African affairs believed that any actual solution would be forthcoming. But we did hope that stern words and perhaps hints of action to come might emerge from Lusaka. In short, we hoped for at least symbolic action.

Instead Mugabe received a hero’s welcome, which shocked and dismayed diplomats and other outside observers. So perhaps the welcome was merely an acknowledgment of Mugabe’s status as a liberation hero and one-time brother-in-arms. Perhaps it represented a last hurrah for the grizzled Zimbabwean strongman.

Not quite. Mbeki’s report was feckless and tepid, asserting that the various parties were in discussions with progress being made. To make matters worse, SADC leaders declared that the accusations aimed at Zimbabwe have been “exaggerated,” and that the country will solve its economic problems. Of course no one was able to explain how Zimbabwe would suddenly end the slow slide into chaos and economic failure that has characterized the bulk of the last decade and that has only accelerated in recent months.

I’m not certain if I have ever agreed with South Africa’s Democratic Alliance on much, but the party position, as presented by the DA’s former leader and current spokesman on foreign affairs, Tony Leon, seem an apt summation:

“The Zimbabwean President was treated to a hero’s welcome in Zambia, and the SADC executive secretary Tomaz Salamao blamed much of the economic woes in Zimbabwe on sanctions,” he said in a statement.

The “cosy attitude” displayed by SADC heads of state towards Mugabe, Leon said, was a further indication that the South African government’s approach to the Zimbabwean crisis was unhelpful and inappropriate.

“Zanu-PF’s attitude and tactics will not be changed by quiet diplomacy or a weak stance by our government,” he said.

Leon said statements made by Zimbabwe’s Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa at the opening of the summit were evidence of the contempt Zanu-PF had for mediation talks spearheaded by Mbeki.

“How many more futile attempts to coax Zanu-PF to behave in a responsible manner will it take before President Mbeki agrees to take a stronger more critical stance on the matter?” asked Leon.

What is perhaps most disappointing is that SADC, in not recognizing Zim’s problems, have made it nearly impossible to pave the way for a post-Mugabe dispensation. It is understandable, after years of ruthless European imperialism followed by an almost equally deleterious era of Cold War clientelism, for African leaders to circle the wagons and to resist being told what to do by the outside world. but to fall back on those canards in the face of the current monstrosity that is Mugabe’s regime is to abandon millions of Africans to the capricious whims of a despot. It is one thing to applaud Mugabe if behind the scenes you are working to find a way out of the mess he has created and to ensure that there will be some prospects for success after Mugabe’s fall or death. That is how high-level diplomacy works. But it is quite another to applaud Mugabe’s face and pat his back. That is how acquiescence to authoritarianism works.

Africans North-to-South, East-to-West are hyper-wary of foreign encroachments. This should come as no surprise after the dual destabilizing phenomena of western imperialism and the Cold War threw Africa into paroxysms of chaos from which it has not ever fully recovered. So despite (or perhaps because of) the myriad examples of China’s increased chumminess with Africa (which I have written about fairly extensively at this blog), including heightened interest from Chinese entrepeneurs, some Africans are increasingly concerned that this exploding Chinese interest just represents old wine in new skins, neo-colonialism from the east rather than the West.

Here is a quick survey of Africa-related news stories that have appeared in the last few days:

Sierra Leone’s voters went to the polls this past weekend and  it appears to have gone off with few allegations of improprieties. Hopefully this marks the first small steps in the country’s redemption.

Sam Dealey, Time magazine’s Africa correspondent, argues in the New York Times that it is unwise, problematic and unnecessary to exaggerate death tolls from crises such as Darfur as some activists are wont to do.

Also in the Times we learn that China’s interest in Africa extends to Chad’s oil resources. It can be assumed that anywhere in Africa where there is oil, China’s presence will soon follow.

Afrifocus has again turned its attention to China’s role in Africa. Worth checking out are a Gareth Evans and  Donald Steinberg article arguing that China’s mindset toward Darfur has changed to the point that “instead of being part of the problem, it could play a significant role in the solution.” If Evans and Steinberg are correct in their assessment, this would provide a pretty good example of why we should never have static conceptions of nation states and their policies.

Also worth checking out is this issue of  Pambazuka News, which is dedicated to the issue of China’s role in Africa, and two Foreign Policy in Focus articles: “China Provokes Debate in Africa” and “China in Africa: It’s (Still) the Governance, Stupid.”

Historians of Africa have long tilted against some of the hoariest, most insidious false assertions made about Africa. Three men who were giants in their fields and in Western intellectual life generally embody the representation of Africa as a land without history, and thus as a land unworthy of attempting to understand. In the eighteenth century the Scottish philosopher David Hume said, “I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There scarcely ever was a civilised nation of that complexion, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or in speculation. No ingenious manufacture among them, no arts, no sciences.” In the nineteenth century the German philosopher Hegel similarly dismissed Africa when he blithely asserted, “Africa is no historical part of the world.” In 1963 Oxford historian Hugh Trevor-Roper, who ought to have known better, repeated this calumny when he dismissed Africa as having “no history” but rather “the unedifying gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant corners of the globe.”

Of course we know these assertions not to be true. By any definition, even the most rigid, Africa has a long, vibrant, and varied history. And of course for those of us engaged in contemporary or modern history, Africa provides a rich tapestry of sadness and loss, hope and promise, a chronicle of human frailties and human strengths, of humankind’s capacity to inflict severe harm or to attain dizzying heights.

Even the seemingly more innocuous version of the libels of Hegal and Hume and Trevor-Roper, the idea that African history is somehow different from that of the West because the written word supposedly eluded the continent and its people and thus shrouded the vast landscape from the Cape to Cairo in epistemological darkness is the stuff of mythology, not reality. Recent discoveries throughout Africa, but centered in the ancient center of learning at Timbuktu, help to demonstrate that Africans have long had a written record, even if that record is not as vast as in some other parts of the world. Discoveries in recent decades have accumulated so quickly that some hope that Mali’s Timbuktu will become the site of a new library akin to the legendary lost library at Alexandria. We can see some of these discoveries through an online exhibition sponsored by the Library of Congress and through a multimedia presentation courtesy of The New York Times.

The vast panoply of African history is increasingly available to all of us. One wonders what Hegel or Hume or Trevor-Roper might have to say about a continent they little understood and barely knew but felt free to dismiss in light of what historians have continued to prove in recent decades. No longer can serious people accept their “unedifying gyrations” and authoritative assertions. History is about nothing so much as change over time. There is a certain glorious irony that history itself has shown how much has changed to refute those who disavowed African history.

Economic development in Africa can be a daunting concept. Countries with little infrastructural foundation are difficult to penetrate, and one of the key dilemmas comes with where to start. Food security, political instability, military conflict and crime, economic chaos — these problems can make building roads and bridges and phone networks nearly impossible to conceive, never mind to execute.

Perhaps the best way to develop larger infrastucture is to start small. At least this is the argument of Ethan Zuckerman, a research fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School (and a former college classmate of your faithful scribe), in The Boston Globe. He discusses the case of Democratic Republic of the Congo entrepreneur Alieu Conteh, who founded the cellular telephone company that became Vodacom Congo:

His success is an example of a new strategy for building infrastructure in Africa that might revolutionize the continent. Called “incremental infrastructure,” the idea is to build essential facilities — telephone networks, power grids, roads — in small pieces using private investment, instead of relying on large, centrally planned, government-run projects. . . .

The infrastructure challenges most African nations face are enormous. Just to meet sub-Saharan Africa’s current power demands, for example, could cost $70 billion in new power plants — even more if African nations begin using power to process minerals locally instead of exporting them to China, North America, and Europe. But the success of entrepreneurs like Alieu Conteh suggests that African infrastructure is a big problem that demands a small solution.

We need to be wary of panaceas, of course. Big solutions and small solutions are necessary throughout Africa, but Zuckerman makes an important case inasmuch as executed properly, small solutions can become big ones, and by growing organically can help provide the development Africa most needs.

Privation connected to poverty and vulnerability to climate change is wreaking havoc throughout the continent. Lesotho continues to suffer from drought-fueled food shortages. The droughts have also affected Swaziland and South Africa. The economic crisis in Swaziland has led to increased sex trafficking among children as well as women. Informal settlements in Namibia are embody hell on earth. Climate change is leading to an increase in malaria cases in Kenya.

 The news of the increased UN-African Union peacekeeping presence has raised hopes of humanitarian relief for the people of Darfur. Sudan claims that it will support the troop presence. We;ll see how long Khartoum’s conciliatory attitude lasts. Some Sudanese, meanwhile, are looking to South Africa for a blueprint for peace.

At Foreign Policy Stephan Faris worries that the boomlet that parts of Africa appear to be enjoying might be chimerical, with oil fueling another manifestation of the resource curse. The Council for Foreign Relations explores the process of ”hunting for elusive peace.” Despite these real concerns, there also is real progress on parts of the continent, as Kofi Annan argues in the Mail & Guardian.

At The New Republic Eliza Griswold analyzes the Somalia crisis as “the other failed invasion,” which is problematic inasmuch as viewing Africa through the prism of Iraq manages to be both too Western-centric while at the same time allowing Iraq to disproportionately warp our views of other issues.

In order to address the mindboggling inflation rate in Zimbabwe (is it really possible that it could reach 100,000% by the end of the year?) the government has issued  a Z$200,000 note worth $1 US. Meanwhile, add water shortages to the daily sufferings of the people of Zim.  

In this week’s New York Times Book Review, John Donnelly, who covers global health and the environment for The Boston Globe, has written a favorable review of Helen Epstein’s The Invisible Cure: Africa, the West, and the Fight Against AIDS. An important book on a vital topic, The Invisible Cure posits that the best solutions to the AIDS crisis in Africa will come from Africans, an argument put forth by many in the development community as well. Of course an Africa for Africans by Africans has been the cri de couer of the continent since independence. But the Pan African dream, the African Renaissance, a solution to the continent’s problems, will not come until good governance, transparency, and democratization are all priorities across the continent, and not just in a few scattered pockets.  

On Sunday former United Nations Secretary general Kofi Annan gave the fifth annual Nelson Mandela lecture at Madiba’s foundation. In his talk Annan entreated African leaders to promote democracy and good governance and to disavow tyranny.

It turns out that throughout much of the continent, Africans are already heeding the call for democracy and away from kleptocracy and dictatorship. In the newest issue of The Journal of Democracy Daniel N. Posner and Daniel J. Young have an article posing the argument that peaceful transitions of power may well already be underway, with force having given way to a general trend toward the rule of law.  In sum, that Africans are benefiting from the “institutionalization of political power.”