South Africa

Philip Gourevitch has a fine piece in the latest New Yorker about the plight of Zimbabwe. There is not a lot that will be new to readers of this blog, but it provides a nice summary of Mugabe’s treachery and South Africa’s laissez faire response.

In some ways these ought to be salad days for Thabo Mbeki and South Africa. The country’s continued growth rate has been in the black for something like one hundred straight months, a claim that few countries in the world can stake. South Africa, already arguably Africa’s hottest tourist destination, is poised to show the world its best profile when it hosts the 2010 World Cup. Mbeki presides over a regional power. The country currently holds the rotation chair on the United Nations Security Council.

And yet despite all of these bounties — maybe because of the last of them — some western nations are beginning to question South Africa’s credentials on one issue where the Rainbow Nation ought to be leading the way: Human Rights. Ingrid Uys at The Zimbabwean has the story on how some are beginning to perceive South Africa, and especially Thabo Mbeki, as “a blot on the region.”

The potential diminishment of South Africa’s reputation comes not only as the result of its fecklessness with regard to Zimbabwe, though Mbeki’s wobbliness is not helping matters. But in its tenure on the security Council South Africa has also blocked security Council resolutions on human rights abuses in Burma and attempted unsuccessfully to prevent the implementation of sanctions against Iran over its nuclear ambitions.

It is not, of course, Mbeki’s responsibility or South Africa’s duty to follow the demands of the West on some sort of party line vote. And South Africa has a tenuous line to walk as it looks outward toward equal acceptance by the west as a vital player within the region and the world while at the same time maintaining its status within Africa, which is often more resented than outside observers might understand. Nonetheless the path that South Africa appears to be forging early in its tenure on the security Council is disquieting, especially when considered in light of the lack of leadership coming from Pretoria with regard to Zimbabwe. One hopes that South Africa does not so prize national sovereignty (as is the case with the Chinese approach to foreign policy and the rhetorical anti-colonial chatterings of Mugabe) that it loses sight of the fact that power sometimes requires the willingness to coerce and compel as well as to support and encourage.

Thabo Mbeki is worried that eleven months is not enough time to provide a climate for Zimbabwe to hold free and fair elections. SADC appointed Mbeki to serve as mediator between Robert Mugabe’s ruling ZANU-PF, which put the old tyrant up as the party’s candidate to serve another term in office, and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and other opposition organizations.

I have no doubt that Mbeki will serve in this capacity conscientiously and possibly even well. But the entire conceit is flawed from the outset. By asking Mbeki to mediate SADC has, unintentionally or not, given Mugabe moral equivalence with the opposition and has given Mugabe its imprimatur. Furthermore, without the capacity to force Mugabe’s hand, it is rather unclear how observers can ensure elections that are either free or fair.

The 2008 elections may not necessarily be characterized by ruthlessness or violence, though almost assuredly there will be some of both in the run-up to the polls. But Mugabe has created a climate where most of the corruption and fear is already instilled in the population. It is difficult to envision a scenario in which the opposition or outside observers will be able to level a playing field already titlted against fairness. This is one of the many reasons why the equanimity of “mediation” is flawed from the outset. Mugabe has already cooked the books, as it were. An even-handed approach thus favors the home team, and there is no greater political home-field advantage than that Mugabe’s ZANU-PF has rigged for itself. 

If Mbeki wants cover to promote change in Zimbabwe, the United States appears set to provide it: The US has made it clear that it is behind the Zimbabwean opposition even though thus far Washington has been unwilling to use the term “regime change.” SADC and Mbeki face the perfect storm for forcing the hand of Mugabe. Mbeki continues to pursue the cautious route, to defer to an old ally against white supremacy and colonialism long after that alliance has been shorn of either relevance or utility.

One of the many reasons why Africa ought to matter more to the United States than it does is because it will continue to provide an important source of oil imports. This week Slate has been running four excerpts from John Ghazvinian’s book Untapped: The Scramble For Africa’s Oil. The excerpts include: Does Africa Measure Up To The hype?; Yes, We Have No Bananas; Will Oil Change Sao Tome and Principe?; and When ExxonMobil Came To Chad.

South Africa is not an oil-rich country. But that does not mean that these questions are not pertinent to South Africa. For one thing, South Africa is a regional power, maybe the regional power, and so continent-wide stability is of more than passing interest to the ANC government. Furthermore, South Africa imports oil and is involved in these economic questions. And as importantly, South Africa must look to the relationship “The West” is forging with wariness of the neocolonial implications, but also with a sense of concern that it might be supplanted as, by and large, the most important African nation in the eyes of the United States and its allies.

Thabo Mbeki, whom leaders of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) appointed to act as mediator between Mugabe and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) when it held its summit in Tanzania last week, appears remarkably sanguine about the crisis in Zimbabwe, all in all. In a recent interview Mbeki, when asked if he believed it likely that Robert Mugabe would peacefully renounce power at some point, responded, “I think so. Yes, sure. You see, President Mugabe and the leadership of [the ruling] Zanu-PF believe they are running a democratic country. That’s why you have an elected opposition, that’s why it’s possible for the opposition to run municipal government [in Harare and Bulawayo].”

One would think that Mbeki had been asked a routine question about local governance in Tshwane and that in Zimbabwe politics as usual has not involved forced removals, oppression of opposition leaders, widespread violence, and the world’s worst inflation rate. But Mugabe and his allies believe they are running a democratic country, see, and who is Mbeki to challenge that? Apparently Mbeki believes that the old tyrant means well, and really, isn’t that the most important thing?

Perhaps this is yet another example of the policy of “quiet diplomacy” that has thus far nonetheless involved more quiet and less diplomacy. Perhaps Mbeki has a strategem that involves carrots, not sticks, honey, not vinegar. But I cannot help but think that Mugabe rests easily when he sees this sort of verbiage flowing from Mbeki’s Pretoria home Mahlambandlopfu, which means “when the elephants bathe.” The elephants bathe. Zimbabwe burns. And somehow Mugabe emerges clean.

Can good governance be encouraged through financial incentives? Sudanese businessman Mo Ibrahim believes it can be and he has established a prize in his name to do so. 

Former United Nations chief Kofi Annan will head the committee making the award, which “will go to former presidents and prime ministers from sub-Saharan Africa who left office in the three years prior and who showed exemplary leadership while in power” and will consist of $5-million over 10 years and then $200 000 each year for the remainder of the recipient’s life. In addition the award-winner will receive another $200 000 annually for charities and other good deeds behind which they put their names. Nelson Mandela is one of many leaders to have placed his support behind the Mo Ibrahim Prize. 

Ibrahim has clearly identified a need area for sub-Saharan Africa. Corruption, kleptocracy, tyranny, and chaos are rife in too many countries stretching north from the Cape of Good Hope. But there is something untoward about all of this, and I cannot quite put my finger on it. Perhaps the problem is simply providing such a huge “reward” for something that ought to be a basic expectation of any leader.

At the same time, Ibrahim’s gesture at least represents an effort to do something to address an issue that continues to plague the region, and the fact that Mandela and others have gotten on board leads me to leave my skepticism at the door at least for the time being.